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A RELATIONAL SIXTH AMENDMENT
DURING INTERROGATION
BROOKS HOLLAND*
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel has been revered as
fundamental to a fair criminal trial. The Supreme Court, moreover, has
deemed this right critical to protecting a defendant's constitutional rights at
a post-charge interrogation. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's modern
Sixth Amendment jurisprudence has undermined the practical import of the
right to counsel in the interrogation context by undervaluing the attorney-
client relationship itself This Article critiques the Supreme Court's Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence and presents an alternative "relational" model
of the right to counsel during post-charge interrogations. The Article
concludes by expressing the goal that states, under their own constitutions,
elect for a relational right to counsel over the "offense-specific" federal
model.
I. INTRODUCTION
[L]awyers in criminal courts are. necessities, not luxuries.
Ever since the U.S. Supreme Court trumpeted the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel in Gideon v. Wainwright,2 our legal culture has extolled the
value of this right in ensuring a fair criminal trial.3 Yet, a "fair trial"
* Assistant Professor of Law and Gonzaga Law Foundation Scholar, Gonzaga University
School of Law. This Article has benefited from the excellent research assistance of Gonzaga
law students Dan Gividen, Michelle Trombley, and Leslie Hayes.
1 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
2 372 U.S. 335. I of course play here upon GIDEON'S TRUMPET (1964), Anthony Lewis's
famous account of Clarence Earl Gideon's story. The Sixth Amendment provides in relevant
part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right.., to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
3 See Alfredo Garcia, The Right to Counsel Under Siege: Requiem for an Endangered
Right?, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 35, 49 (1991) (observing that "[flew decisions have evoked as
much popular support as Gideon"); Yale Kamisar, The Gideon Case 25 Years Later, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 10, 1988, at A27 (characterizing Gideon as "one of the most popular decisions
ever handed down by the United States Supreme Court"); Edward M. Kennedy, The Promise
of Equal Justice, CHAMPION, Jan.-Feb. 2003, at 23 (contending that "[t]he Gideon
decision.., showed the Supreme Court at its best"); ef Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment
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implicates much more than the trial itself, particularly since the vast
majority of today's criminal cases-90% or more-are resolved by
negotiated disposition rather than trial.4 Defendants thus rarely face their
accusers during traditional courtroom proceedings that pit skilled trial
lawyers against each other. Instead, defense attorneys determine most
clients' fate through telephone calls, meetings, and investigations, and by
advising a client effectively on how properly to limit the scope or strength
of a prosecution, all to achieve the best disposition possible.5 Increasingly,
First Principles, 84 GEO. L.J. 641 (1996). Some observers, however, have expressed
concern that the reality of the Sixth Amendment does not match the rhetoric. See, e.g.,
Pamela R. Metzger, Beyond the Bright Line: A Contemporary Right-to-Counsel Doctrine, 97
Nw. U. L. REV. 1635, 1636 (2003) (arguing that "[tlhe rhetoric of the Sixth Amendment is
grand; the reality is grim"); Amanda Myra Hornung, Note, The Paper Tiger of Gideon v.
Wainright and the Evisceration of the Right to Appointment of Legal Counsel for Indigent
Defendants, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 495, 497 (2005) (arguing that the
Supreme Court's post-Gideon approach to the fight to appointed counsel, as well as effective
assistance of counsel, has abridged the promise of Gideon). See also Mary Sue Backus &
Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J.
1031 (2006), in which the authors detail the findings of the National Committee on the Right
to Counsel, concluding:
[F]orty years after Gideon, this nation is still struggling to implement the right to counsel in
state criminal and juvenile proceedings. Sadly, there is abundant evidence that systems of
indigent defense routinely fail to assure fairness because of under-funding and other problems. It
is also more evident now than ever before that innocent persons, sometimes represented by
incompetent, unqualified, or overburdened defense lawyers, are convicted and imprisoned.
Id. at 1039-40 (citing Norman Lefstein, In Search of Gideon's Promise: Lessons from
England and the Need for Federal Help, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 835, 838 (2004)).
4 1 can attest to this fact from my own fifteen years of experience as a criminal defense
attorney, including eleven years as a trial-level public defender. See U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL part A(4)(c) (2005) (explaining that "[n]early ninety percent of all
federal criminal cases involve guilty pleas"); Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Getting to
"Guilty ": Plea Bargaining as Negotiation, 2 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 115, 116-17 (1997)
(noting that "[b]y most accounts, plea bargaining disposes of approximately ninety percent
of all criminal cases in the United States"). I use the phrase "negotiated disposition" instead
of "negotiated guilty plea" because not all case dispositions involve guilty pleas. See, e.g.,
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.55 (McKinney 2007) (providing for an "adjournment in
contemplation of dismissal"). For a very spirited critique of our plea bargaining system, see
Paul Craig Roberts, Seeking a Return to Justice, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2001, at A15.
5 See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 4, at 122-47 (discussing roles of defense counsel,
prosecutors, and the courts in modem plea bargaining process); Metzger, supra note 3, at
1636-37 ("[N]ational trends of mandatory sentencing and sentencing guidelines
revolutionized criminal procedure and dramatically altered the roles of the system's key
players. Now, defense counsel's role outside the courtroom is substantially amplified.").
The "holistic advocacy," or "therapeutic jurisprudence," movement may represent a natural
response to this increase in pretrial intervention, services, and dispositions. See David B.
Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Criminal Courts, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 279,
280 (1993) (explaining that "[t]herapeutic jurisprudence is the study of the role of the law as
a therapeutic agent"); see also Susan Daicoff, Law as a Healing Profession: The
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the assistance of counsel during a criminal prosecution occurs in pretrial
contexts where, after a charge has been filed,6 preemptive legal advice is
imparted, damage is minimized, and bargains are struck.
Comprehensive Law Movement, 6 PEPP. Disp. RESOL. L.J. 1 (2006). For strong proponents of
holistic advocacy by criminal defense lawyers, see, e.g., Robin Steinberg & David Feige,
Cultural Revolution: Transforming the Public Defender's Office, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 123 (2004); David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Rehabilitative
Role of the Criminal Defense Lawyer, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 743 (2005). For some
measured critiques of holistic advocacy in criminal defense work, see Brooks Holland,
Holistic Advocacy: An Important but Limited Institutional Role, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 637 (2006); Mae C. Quinn, An RSVP to Professor Wexler's Warm Therapeutic
Jurisprudence Invitation to the Criminal Defense Bar: Unable to Join You, Already
(Somewhat Similarly) Engaged, 48 B.C. L. REv. 539 (2007). For the response, see David B.
Wexler, Not Such a Party Pooper: An Attempt to Accommodate (Many o) Professor Quinn 's
Concerns About Therapeutic Jurisprudence Criminal Defense Lawyering, 48 B.C. L. REV.
597 (2007).
6 The filing of a charge or the initiation of an adversarial judicial proceeding is critical
for Sixth Amendment purposes, as the Sixth Amendment does not convey a right to counsel
during any and all law enforcement investigations. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412,
428-32 (1986) (rejecting argument that any right to counsel attaches under Sixth Amendment
during pre-charge interrogation); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 309-10 (1966)
(rejecting argument that once the Government had enough evidence to charge Hoffa with
jury tampering offenses, it could not continue a pre-charge investigation without violating
Hoffa's right to counsel, since a charge would have triggered that right); see also WAYNE R.
LAFAVE ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: INVESTIGATION § 5.4(d), at 287 (2004)
(noting that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is not triggered "merely because the
defendant ha[s] been arrested without a warrant, nor is it met.., merely because the
investigation has focused upon the defendant"); cf Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688-91
(1972) (rejecting applicability of Sixth Amendment at pre-charge, post-arrest identification
procedure). Rather, the Sixth Amendment assures a right to counsel upon "the initiation of
adversary criminal proceedings-whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing,
indictment, information or arraignment." McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 176 (1991)
(quoting United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188 (1984); Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689). See
generally Rothgery v. Gillespie Co., 128 S. Ct. 2578, 2592 (2008) (holding that "a criminal
defendant's initial appearance before a judicial officer, where he learns the charge against
him and his liberty is subject to restriction, marks the start of adversary judicial proceedings
that trigger attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel"). The right to appointed
counsel has been held to extend only to those defendants who are charged with a felony or
an offense resulting in actual imprisonment. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979);
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972); see also Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654,
674 (2002). The right also applies only during "critical stages" of pretrial proceedings. See
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967); cf Rothgery, 128 S. Ct. at 2594 (Alito, J.,
concurring) (agreeing that the right to counsel attached at defendant's magistration, but
observing that "Texas counties need only appoint counsel as far in advance of trial, and as
far in advance of any pretrial 'critical stage,' as necessary to guarantee effective assistance at
trial" (emphasis added)); United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 310 (1973).
Prior to a charge or other adversarial proceeding, only the Fifth Amendment right to
counsel may be invoked, and only to protect the right against self-incrimination. See
Gouveia, 467 U.S. at 188 n.5 (explaining that "we have made clear that we required counsel
in Miranda ... in order to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
2009]
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Perhaps in no pretrial context can this advice of counsel matter more
than during an interrogation,7 where cases and deals often can be won or
lost.8 Yet, the U.S. Supreme Court's current right to counsel jurisprudence
profoundly minimizes the importance of the attorney-client relationship
during post-charge, pretrial interrogation. For example, notwithstanding the
Court's view that a post-charge interrogation constitutes a "critical stage,"
thus entitling a defendant to appointed counsel, 9 the Court has undermined
rather than to vindicate the Sixth Amendment right to counsel"); Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 444 (1966); see also LAFAVE ET AL., supra, § 10.1(c), at 532 (discussing derivative
right to counsel under the Fifth Amendment); Donald A. Dripps, Constitutional Theory for
Criminal Procedure: Dickerson, Miranda, and the Continuing Quest for Broad-but-Shallow,
43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 16 (2001) (noting that "[e]arly in the [Miranda] oral arguments,
it became clear that the heart of the controversy was the Fifth Amendment, not the Sixth");
Justin Bishop Grewell, Supreme Court Review, A Walk in the Constitutional Orchard:
Distinguishing Fruits of Fifth Amendment Right to Counsel from Sixth Amendment Right to
Counsel in Fellers v. United States, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 725, 727-31, 752-57
(2005) (outlining the differences between the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel);
Jennifer Diana, Comment, Apples and Oranges and Olives? Oh My! Fellers, the Sixth
Amendment, and the Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 985, 992-
1007 (2005) (same).
7Cf Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 399-400 (1977) (identifying "deliberate
elicitation" standard under Sixth Amendment).
8 See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296 (1991) ("A confession is like no other
evidence. Indeed, 'the defendant's own confession is probably the most probative and
damaging evidence that can be admitted against him .... The admissions of a defendant
come from the actor himself, the most knowledgeable and unimpeachable source of
information about his past conduct. Certainly, confessions have profound impact on the
jury, so much so that we may justifiably doubt its ability to put them out of mind even if told
to do so."' (alterations in original) (quoting Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 139-40
(1968) (White, J., dissenting)) (citing Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 195 (1986) (White,
J., dissenting)); Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 313 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("If the jury believes
that a defendant has admitted the crime, it doubtless will be tempted to rest its decision on
that evidence alone, without careful consideration of the other evidence in the case. Apart,
perhaps, from a videotape of the crime, one would have difficulty finding evidence more
damaging to a criminal defendant's plea of innocence."); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 585
(1884) ("[A confession is] among the most effectual proofs in the law, and constitutes the
strongest evidence against the party making it that can be given of the facts stated in such
confession."). For an overview of the complex factors informing plea bargaining that could
be settled or compromised by a confession, see, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining
Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463 (2004); Talia Fisher & Iaasachar
Rosen-Zvi, The Confessional Penalty, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 871 (2008); Robert E. Scott &
William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909 (1992); Andrew E.
Taslitz, Prosecutorial Preconditions to Plea Negotiations, 23 A.B.A. CRIM. JUSTICE, Fall
2008, at 14.
9 Brewer, 430 U.S. at 398 (identifying post-charge interrogation as a "critical stage" for
Sixth Amendment purposes); see, e.g., Maine v. Moulten, 474 U.S. 168, 176 (1985)
(suppressing State's recording of conversation between defendant and undercover informant
after right to counsel attached because "[t]he Sixth Amendment guarantees the
accused ... the right to rely on counsel as a 'medium' between him and the State"); Massiah
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the real-world import of this ruling by holding that the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel, even once attached, is not self-actuating and thus can be
waived in the absence of counsel.1° Further, the Supreme Court largely
gutted the notion that counsel's constitutional value to a client extends
beyond the four corners of the charging instrument when the Court declared
that the right to counsel is "'offense specific,""' 1 with offense defined
narrowly under the Blockburger double-jeopardy test.1 2  The practical
consequence of these holdings is that law enforcement easily can work
around an existing attorney-client relationship to question a charged
defendant about nearly anything, up to and including the precise factual
subject of filed charges.
1 3
v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964) (suppressing defendant's statements to a co-
conspirator acting as an agent of the police because "federal agents had deliberately elicited
[them] after he had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel").
10 See Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 290-92 (1988).
11 Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 177 (2001) (quoting McNeil, 501 U.S. at 175). An
offense-specific analysis of the Sixth Amendment actually can be seen as early as 1966 in
Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, where the Supreme Court rejected the claim that a
government agent's surreptitious invasion of confidential trial preparation meetings should
be suppressed in a separate prosecution for attempting to bribe jurors in that trial. See id. at
304-09. But, the Supreme Court never expressly defined the Sixth Amendment concept of
an "offense" prior to Cobb. Cf McNeil, 501 U.S. at 187 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(emphasizing that "[t]he Court ... does not flesh out the precise boundaries of its newly
created 'offense-specific' limitation on a venerable constitutional right").
12 See Cobb, 532 U.S. at 173-74 (adopting Blockburger double-jeopardy test to define
"offenses" for Sixth Amendment purposes); Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304
(1932) (explaining that "where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two
distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two
offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the
other does not").
13 Several commentators already have observed the doctrinal constriction that Cobb
worked upon the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See, e.g., Michael J. Howe, Note,
Tomorrow's Massiah: Towards a "Prosecution Specific" Understanding of the Sixth
Amendment Right to Counsel, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 134, 149 (2004) (observing that "[w]hile
it is still too soon to know the total impact Texas v. Cobb will have on the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel, it is clear that the scope of the Massiah right has been significantly
narrowed"); see also Elkan Abramowitz & Barry A. Bohrer, The Right to Counsel After
Cobb: Is There Anything Left?, N.J. L.J., July 2, 2001, at 33 (arguing that Cobb "pulls the
rug out from under [the Court's previous Sixth Amendment decisions], leaving defendants
open for additional questioning outside the presence of counsel even after their Sixth
Amendment rights have attached"); Benjamin F. Diamond, Comment, The Sixth
Amendment: Narrowing the Scope of the Right to Counsel, 54 FLA. L. REV. 1001, 1010-11
(2002) (observing that Cobb narrowed, constricted, or diminished the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel); Angela Henson, Note, Now You Have It, Now You Don't: The Sixth
Amendment Right to Counsel After Texas v. Cobb, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 1359, 1382-83
(2002) (same); Beth G. Hungate-Noland, Casenote, Texas v. Cobb: A Narrow Road Ahead
for the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 1191, 1222-23 (2002)
(same); Melissa Minas, Note, Blurring the Line: Impact of Offense-Specific Sixth
2009]
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This Article examines and critiques this Sixth Amendment right-to-
counsel jurisprudence, focusing on the Supreme Court's failure to establish
Sixth Amendment rules that recognize and protect the necessary
professional relationship that attorney and client share in a criminal case.
14
To frame this discussion, Part IL.A of the Article surveys the Supreme
Court's right-to-counsel jurisprudence in the interrogation context,
culminating in the Patterson-Cobb framework, and highlights the debate
within the Court over the function that defense counsel serves under the
Sixth Amendment.
In Part III, this Article distills the Court's Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence to its core: a general apathy towards-if not outright disdain
for-the real-world professional value of defense counsel during an
interrogation. This view of counsel's role in this context has led the Court
improperly to gauge Sixth Amendment problems by a counter-textual free-
will theory of client decision-making imported from Fifth Amendment
Miranda jurisprudence. This emphasis on free-will in the Sixth
Amendment context is wholly disconnected from the counsel whose
assistance the Constitution assures to guide defendant decision-making,
resulting in precisely the sort of unequal footing between established
adversaries that the attomey-client relationship is meant to counter-
balance. 1
5
Amendment Right to Counsel, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 195, 213 (2002) (same). But
cf Paul Greg Laughlin, Casenote, The Court Means What It Says as It Gives One Sixth
Amendment Exclusionary Defense a Christian Burial, 43 S. TEX. L. REV. 935, 952 (2002)
(defending Cobb, and asserting that "[t]he Cobb Court's application of the Blockburger test
is an effort to strengthen its stance on prophylactic safeguards and perhaps make the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel a little broader in some respects"); Texas v. Cobb Paves Way
for Increase in Use of Informants, 17 CRIM. PRAC. REP., April 16, 2008, at 11.
14 By "professional relationship," I do not mean the type of "meaningful" relationship
rejected in Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1 (1983)-assigned counsel of choice, essentially.
Instead, I mean the type of professional relationship that a competent attorney would
maintain with a client to protect the client's procedural and substantive interests.
15 Cf Garcia, supra note 3, at 35 (asserting that "[t]he rights delineated in the [Sixth]
Amendment are meant to equalize the balance of power in the criminal process ... against
the natural advantage the prosecution enjoys in a criminal trial"); Metzger, supra note 3, at
1641 (arguing that the Sixth Amendment "reflected the colonists' evolutionary intent: to
create a level playing field for the defendant"). Admittedly, the Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence has been seen as "a body of law lacking theoretical cohesion." Martin R.
Gardner, The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel and Its Underlying Values: Defining the
Scope of Privacy Protection, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 397, 398 (2000); see also Amar,
supra note 3, at 641 (arguing that "the legal community lacks a good map of [the Sixth
Amendment's] basic contours, a good sense of its underlying ecosystem, a good plan for its
careful cultivation"). But several values protected by the Sixth Amendment have been
articulated that may overlap with this "level playing field" theory. See, e.g., Amar, supra
note 3, at 705 (arguing that "innocence protection and truth-seeking are, or should be,
central" values to the Sixth Amendment); Gardner, supra, at 399-409 (identifying fairness,
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In Part III.C, this Article presents an alternative "relational" model for
the right to counsel. I argue that this alternate model properly takes the
concept of a defendant's free will from the Fifth Amendment Miranda
context, and conditions its exercise in the Sixth Amendment context on the
promised assistance of counsel if the subject or setting of interrogation
intrudes into that attorney-client relationship or necessitates that
relationship to preserve equal footing between established adversaries. This
model, I argue, correctly conceptualizes the right to counsel in relational
terms of attorney and client, not attorney and offenses.'
6
Part IV of this Article considers the potential for competing state-law
models of the right to counsel. Part IV.A examines the New York State
model of the right to counsel, which predates Patterson and Cobb and
differs markedly from this federal model, protecting the attorney-client
relationship in a manner similar to what this Article proposes. The New
York model thus will be highlighted in particular as similar in form and
attorney-client privacy, and autonomy as potential Sixth Amendment values).
16 Remedy presents a whole other question. Suppression of derivative evidence, of
course, would represent the most traditional remedy for right to counsel violations
challenged in criminal proceedings. After Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006),
however, one might question the future of the exclusionary rule. See id. at 590-602
(referring to the remedy of suppression as one of "last resort," and rejecting application of
exclusionary rule to knock-and-announce violations under the Fourth Amendment). But see
id. at 602-03 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing that "the continued operation of the
exclusionary rule, as settled and defined by our precedents, is not in doubt. Today's decision
determines only that in the specific context of the knock-and-announce requirement, a
violation is not sufficiently related to the later discovery of evidence to justify suppression");
H. Mitchell Caldwell, Fixing the Constable's Blunder: Can One Trial Judge in One County
in One State Nudge a Nation Beyond the Exclusionary Rule?, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1, 5-6, 21-
28 (arguing that this "is not meant to be just another academic alternative to the exclusionary
rule that would quickly be relegated to the junkyard of such proposals, but is meant to be a
guideline for actually moving past the rule," and exploring data from several studies
indicating the rule's lack of success in achieving its asserted goals); Mark A. Summers, The
Constable Blunders but Isn 't Punished: Does Hudson v. Michigan's Abolition of the
Exclusionary Rule Extend Beyond Knock-and-Announce Violations?, 10 BARRY L. REv. 25,
39-40 (2008) (observing that a "trend in the post-Hudson cases is the demise of the rule as a
remedy for statutory violations of any kind unless the statute itself provides for suppression.
Beyond that it is not possible to generalize that there have been inroads into the case-by-case
approach to the exclusionary rule for other constitutional violations" (internal footnote
omitted)). The Supreme Court's recent decision in Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695
(2009), has generated further questions about the future of the exclusionary rule. See id. at
701 (holding that "[t]he extent to which the exclusionary rule is justified by ... deterrence
principles varies with the culpability of the law enforcement conduct"); see, e.g., SUSAN A.
BANDES, THE ROBERTS COURT AND THE FUTURE OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE (2009),
available at http://www.acslaw.org/files/Bandes%201ssue%20Brief.pdf; Wayne R. LaFave,
The Smell of Herring: A Critique of the Supreme Court's Latest Assault on the Exclusionary




function to a relational model of the Sixth Amendment. Part IV.B surveys
how state courts thus far have treated and applied Cobb: so far, courts have
treated it modestly, although some questions remain in certain jurisdictions
that have left open the possibility of competing state law approaches to the
right to counsel during interrogation.
II. A PRIMER ON THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL
A. AN INTRODUCTION
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that "[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence."'17  This right was "intended to
minimize the public prosecutor's tremendous advantage" over lay-persons
in matters of law and procedure.' 8 By the early twentieth century, the
Supreme Court had "construed this [amendment] to mean that in federal
courts counsel must be provided for defendants unable to employ counsel
unless the right is competently and intelligently waived."'19 But as the Court
17 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
18 Garcia, supra note 3, at 35 (asserting that "[the rights delineated in the [Sixth]
Amendment are meant to equalize the balance of power in the criminal process... against
the natural advantage the prosecution enjoys in a criminal trial"); Metzger, supra note 3, at
1640 (citing, inter alia, AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION 117 (1998)); cf Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963)
(observing that "[g]ovemments, both state and federal, quite properly spend vast sums of
money to establish machinery to try defendants accused of crime," and "[t]hat government
hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend are
the strongest indications of the wide-spread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are
necessities, not luxuries"); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (focusing on ability of
counsel to equalize the adversarial setting between charged "ignorant," "illiterate" youth and
the State as essential to ascertainment of truth through the adversarial process). For a fuller
historical survey of the Sixth Amendment, from its roots in colonial times to the Supreme
Court's modem "critical stage" doctrine, see Metzger, supra note 3, at 1637-57, in which
Professor Metzger observes that "[t]he counsel guarantee has never been a rigid or static
doctrine." Id. at 1637; see also Powell, 287 U.S. at 60-71 (detailing the American Colonies'
rejection of the English rule denying right to counsel in treason and felony cases); Garcia,
supra note 3, at 39-42 (summarizing the English and colonial background of the right to
counsel); Eugene L. Shapiro, Waiver of a State Constitutional Right to Counsel During Post-
Attachment Interrogation, 30 VAL. U. L. REv. 581, 582-84 (1996) (summarizing pre-
colonial, colonial, and early constitutional approaches to the right to counsel).
'9 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 340 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)). The
Supreme Court has observed, however, that "[tihere is considerable doubt that the Sixth
Amendment itself, as originally drafted by the Framers of the Bill of Rights, contemplated
any guarantee other than the right of an accused in a criminal prosecution in a federal court
to employ a lawyer to assist in his defense." Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 370 (1979)
(citing WILLIAM M. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 27-30 (1955)).
Perhaps this original understanding accounts for the fact that "[flrom the Sixth Amendment's
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embarked on its incorporation doctrine, folding rights "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty" into the Due Process Clause,2° the Court truly
began to examine the role that counsel plays in our system of justice.21
In the landmark 1963 decision of Gideon v. Wainwright,22 the Supreme
Court declared:
[11n our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is
too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided to
him. This seems to us to be an obvious truth .... [L]awyers in criminal courts are
necessities, not luxuries.
23
The Court since Gideon consistently has reaffirmed that the "right to
the assistance of counsel ... is indispensable to the fair administration of
our adversarial system of criminal justice, ' '24 because it "safeguards the
other rights deemed essential for the prosecution of a criminal
proceeding."
2 5
Yet, the generalized "right" to counsel recognized in Gideon did not
fix the scope of a lawyer's representation to which the Sixth Amendment
entitles a defendant. For clearly, when that right attaches, "[i]t cannot be
invoked once for all future prosecutions. 26 But, the Court has not accepted
that the right exists only when counsel appears at some formal proceeding
along with the prosecutor.27 As a result, the Supreme Court has devoted
much energy to refining when and to what extent a defendant must be
afforded this "indispensable" assistance of counsel.
ratification in December 1791 until the early 1930s, the Supreme Court did not issue any
opinions of significance concerning the Sixth Amendment right to counsel." Daniel R.
Dinger, Successive Interviews and Successful Prosecutions: The Interplay of the Sixth
Amendment Right to Counsel and the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine in a Post-Cobb World, 40
TEX. TECH L. REv. 917, 926 (2008).
20 See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
21 See, e.g., Powell, 287 U.S. at 68 (reversing indigent youths' convictions for capital
murder after they stood trial without counsel, describing "the right to the aid of counsel" as
having a "fundamental character"); cf Garcia, supra note 3, at 42 (observing that "[t]he
emergence of an expansive approach to the right to counsel may be traced to the Supreme
Court's seminal decision in Powell v. Alabama").
22 372 U.S. 335.
23 Id. at 344.
24 Maine v. Molten, 474 U.S 159, 168 (1985).
25 Id. at 169.
26 McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991).
27 See Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 633 (1986) (rejecting the idea that "requests
for the appointment of counsel should be construed to apply only to representation in formal
legal proceedings"); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967) (noting that "the
accused is guaranteed that he need not stand alone against the State at any stage of the
prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel's absence might derogate
from the accused's right to a fair trial").
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The Supreme Court has determined that the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel attaches when "a prosecution is commenced... 'whether by way of
formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or
arraignment."' 28 Prior to any actual trial, the right, once attached, applies
only at a "critical stage" of the proceedings, which includes interrogations
and lineups, for instance. 29 During such proceedings, "the State must of
course honor [the right], 3° meaning "the State [has] an affirmative
obligation to respect and preserve the accused's choice to seek this
assistance.''31  At a minimum, the "Sixth Amendment guarantees the
accused... the right to rely on counsel as a 'medium' between him [or her]
and the State.,
32
Law enforcement's obligation to honor counsel's role as a medium,
however, frustrates one of its greatest interests in investigating crimes-
questioning the suspect.33 The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the
"police have an interest in the thorough investigation of crimes for which
formal charges have already been filed,, 34 as well as "in investigating new
or additional crimes., 35 But, the Court also has explained that "[i]n seeking
evidence pertaining to pending charges ... the Government's investigative
powers are limited by the Sixth Amendment rights of the accused."
36
"Accordingly, the Sixth Amendment is violated when the State obtains
incriminating statements by knowingly circumventing the accused's right to
have counsel present in a confrontation between the accused and a state
agent. 37 For example, "the surreptitious employment of a cellmate3t ... or
2 McNeil, 501 U.S. at 175 (quoting United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188 (1984));
see also Rothgery v. Gillespie Co., 128 S. Ct. 2578, 2592 (2008); Brewer v. Williams, 430
U.S. 387, 398 (1977); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972).
29 See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 428 (1986) (recognizing that "the defendant has
the right to the presence of an attorney during any interrogation occurring after the first
formal charging proceeding, the point at which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
initially attaches"); Wade, 388 U.S. at 224 (observing that "our cases have construed the
Sixth Amendment guarantee to apply to 'critical' stages of the proceedings").
30 Moulton, 474 U.S at 170.
31 Id. at 171.
32 Id. at 176.
33 See Fisher & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 8, at 873 (observing that "the entire criminal
justice system is organized around confessions .... The lure of the confession is too strong
to resist. Like the Sirens' Song, it casts a spell on all those who hear it."); see also Fred E.
Inbau, Police Interrogation-A Practical Necessity, 52 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE
Sci. 16 (1961) (arguing the importance of interrogating suspects when investigating crime).
" Moulton, 474 U.S at 179.
35 id.
36 Id. at 179-80.
" Id. at 176.
38 Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 632-33 (1986) (citing United States v. Henry, 447
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the electronic surveillance of conversations with third parties39 ... may
violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel even though the
same methods of investigation might have been permissible before
arraignment or indictment.,
40
B. JACKSON TO COBB: FROM A BROAD TO AN "OFFENSE SPECIFIC"
RIGHT
I do not propose to quibble with these general Sixth Amendment
standards governing the right to counsel. These standards, however, do not
resolve the ultimate question of whether, once the right has attached, the
Sixth Amendment bars any law enforcement questioning of a defendant
without counsel. For example, must a defendant assert his or her desire for
counsel during post-charge interrogation before law enforcement must
honor that right? Does the freedom of choice protected by Miranda
warnings adequately protect Sixth Amendment interests? Once in play,
does the Sixth Amendment right to counsel protect the attorney-client
relationship, or is this protective right limited to the precise subject
matter-filed charges-that triggered the right in the first place?
Starting with Michigan v. Jackson,41 the Supreme Court issued a series
of decisions initially suggesting that the Sixth Amendment takes a broad
view of the attorney-client relationship during interrogation. Ultimately,
however, the Court answered these questions firmly in the negative, leaving
open numerous opportunities for law enforcement to question a represented
defendant.
1. Michigan v. Jackson: A Broad Sixth Amendment
In Jackson, two separate defendants requested counsel at their
arraignments on murder charges.4' The police subsequently questioned the
defendants, who both remained incarcerated, about their pending charges
without notifying their attorneys.43 Both defendants agreed to speak to the
police without counsel after receiving Miranda warnings,44 and the trial
court admitted the defendants' statements at trial.45
U.S. 264 (1980)).
39 Jackson, 475 U.S. at 632 (citing Moulton, 474 U.S. 159; Massiah v. United States, 377
U.S. 201 (1964)).
40 Id. at 633.
41 id.
42 Id. at 627-28.
43 Id.
44 Under Miranda, before the police may interrogate a suspect in custody, they must
advise the suspect of the right to remain silent, that anything said may be used against the
suspect, and of the right to counsel during interrogation, including appointed counsel if the
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On appeal, the defendants argued that the Fifth Amendment rule from
Edwards v. Arizona46 should apply to police questioning after the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel has attached: "[A]n accused.., having
expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not
subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been
made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further
communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police., 47 Thus, the
defendants argued, once their Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached at
arraignment and they requested this assistance, the police should not have
questioned the defendants without counsel unless the defendants initiated
the conversation.48
The Supreme Court embraced this position, finding that once the
defendants' Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached at arraignment, the
police could not overcome the defendants' request for counsel by
administering Miranda rights.49 Rather, the Court opined:
[T]he reasons for prohibiting the interrogation of an uncounseled prisoner who has
asked for the help of a lawyer are even stronger after he has been formally charged
with an offense than before ... [because of] the significance of the formal accusation,
and the corresponding attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel .... Thus, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel at a postarraignment
interrogation requires at least as much protection as the Fifth Amendment right to
counsel at any custodial interrogation.
5 0
The Court rejected the State's argument that the defendants "may not
have actually intended their request for counsel [at arraignment] to
encompass representation during any further questioning by the police.,
51
On the contrary, the Court noted the strict standard for waiver of
constitutional rights, which:
[R]equires us to give a broad, rather than a narrow, interpretation to a defendant's
request for counsel-we presume that the defendant requests the lawyer's services at
every critical stage of the prosecution. We thus reject the State's suggestion that
[defendants'] requests for the appointment of counsel should be construed to apply
only to representation in formal legal proceedings.
52
suspect cannot afford counsel. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486, 467-75 (1966).
45 Jackson, 475 U.S. at 627-28.
46 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 436.
47 Id. at 484-85.
48 See id. at 484-85; see also Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 641 (1984) (reaffirming
that "once a suspect has invoked the right to counsel, any subsequent conversation must be
initiated by him").
49 Jackson, 475 U.S. at 636.
5 /d. at 631-32.
I' /d. at 632-33:
52 Id. at 633.
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Jackson accordingly held that "if police initiate interrogation after a
defendant's assertion, at an arraignment or similar proceeding, of his right
to counsel, any waiver of the defendant's right to counsel for that police-
initiated interrogation is invalid.
5 3
The decision in Jackson did not turn on the Court's assessment of
whether the defendant freely wanted to speak to the authorities, independent
of any assistance that counsel may have provided. Rather, the Court
indicated that beyond a certain point in a criminal proceeding, the Sixth
Amendment ensures that a defendant will have assistance when making
critical decisions, including whether to go it alone when talking with the
authorities. Jackson consequently appears to extend broad entitlement to
counsel during interrogation once the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
has attached.54 In Patterson v. Illinois,55 however, the Supreme Court
retreated from such a broad understanding of the right to counsel.
2. Patterson v. Illinois: A Passive Sixth Amendment
In Patterson, the Supreme Court made clear that it did not intend in
Jackson for the attachment of the right to counsel alone to create an
impenetrable barrier to law enforcement questioning a defendant. Patterson
also highlights the Court's soon-to-be-repeated division over the
53 Id. at 636. In Owens v. Bowersox, 290 F.3d 960 (8th Cir. 2002), the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals found that the defendant had "initiated" an interrogation, despite rather
unusual circumstances. The defendant was arraigned on state murder charges and invoked
his right to counsel. See id. at 962. After arraignment, a detective picked up the defendant's
mother to bring her to the station. See id. The defendant's mother informed the detective
that "she had talked to [the defendant] on the phone and had persuaded him to tell the truth
and that [a relative] had nothing to do with the murders," and that he "agreed he would talk
to the police and tell the truth, and ... was willing to talk to the police." Id. (second
alteration in original and internal quotation marks omitted). At the precinct, the detective
told the defendant about his mother's claim that he wanted to talk, which the defendant
confirmed, and the defendant then gave an inculpatory statement. See id In rejecting the
defendant's habeas claim, the Eighth Circuit concluded that "[a]lthough the state's position
undoubtedly would be stronger if [the defendant] himself had contacted the police, we do not
believe that it was unreasonable for the state court to hold that a defendant may 'evince' a
willingness and desire to discuss the crime by communicating with the police through a third
party, especially a close relative." Id. at 963.
54 Cf Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 428 (1986) (noting that "[i]t is clear, of course,
that, absent a valid waiver, the defendant has the right to the presence of an attorney during
any interrogation occurring after the first formal charging proceeding, the point at which the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel initially attaches" (emphasis added)); Camley v. Cochran,
369 U.S. 506, 513 (1962) (explaining that "when the Constitution grants protection against
criminal proceedings without the assistance of counsel, counsel must be furnished 'whether
or not the accused requested the appointment of counsel"' (emphasis added) (citing McNeal
v. Culver, 365 U.S. 109, 111 n.1 (1961))).
" 487 U.S. 285 (1988).
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significance of counsel's role in representing defendants during
interrogation and, ultimately, in contributing to a fair prosecution.
In Patterson, the defendant was indicted for a gang-related murder.
After the indictment was returned, the defendant spoke with a police officer
transporting him to a new jail. This officer had interviewed the defendant
two days earlier.57  The officer administered Miranda warnings, and the
defendant implicated himself in the murder.58 Later that day, the defendant
confessed again to a prosecutor working on the murder case, also after
Miranda warnings. 59  The trial court admitted both of the defendant's
statements.
On appeal, the defendant raised two Sixth Amendment arguments in
support of suppression. First, the defendant argued that, under Jackson,
"because his Sixth Amendment right to counsel arose with his indictment,
the police were thereafter barred from initiating a meeting with him.,
60
Second, the defendant asserted that the Miranda warnings the officer read,
although sufficient for a waiver of his Fifth Amendment right to counsel,
did not produce a valid waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
6t
The Supreme Court resolved the defendant's first argument swiftly.
The Court acknowledged that "[t]here can be no doubt that [defendant] had
the right to have the assistance of counsel at his postindictment interviews
with law enforcement authorities. 62 However, the defendant:
[Alt no time sought to exercise his right to have counsel present. The fact that
[defendant's] Sixth Amendment right came into existence with his
indictment.., does not distinguish him from the preindictment interrogatee whose
[Fifth Amendment] right to counsel is in existence and available for his exercise while
he is questioned.
63
The Court distinguished Jackson, as that decision "turned on the fact
that the accused 'ha[d] asked for the help of a lawyer' in dealing with the
police. 64 In Patterson, by contrast, the defendant "had not retained, or
accepted by appointment, a lawyer to represent him at the time he was
questioned by authorities., 65 That fact would have triggered "a distinct set
of constitutional safeguards aimed at preserving the sanctity of the attorney-
56 Id. at 287-88.
17 Id. at 288.
58 id.
51 Id. at 288-89.
60 Id. at 290.
61 See id. at 292.
62 Id. at 290.
63 Id. at 290-91.
64 Id. at 291 (citing Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 631, 633-35 (1986)).
65 Id. at 290 n.3.
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client relationship .... Indeed, the analysis changes markedly once an
accused even requests the assistance of counsel. 66 The Court concluded by
explaining:
Preserving the integrity of an accused's choice to communicate with police only
through counsel is the essence of Edwards and its progeny-not barring an accused
from making an initial election as to whether he will face the State's officers during
questioning with the aid of counsel, or go it alone.
67
Patterson consequently precludes any argument that the Sixth
Amendment limits law enforcement's ability to question a defendant "pre-
invocation" any more than the Fifth Amendment under Miranda-in either
context, absent a request for counsel, law enforcement may prompt the
questioning of a defendant, and the ball remains in the defendant's court to
alert law enforcement of his or her desire to deal with them only through
counsel.68 As one federal circuit court recently explained, "[a]ttachment
and invocation are distinct legal events, 69 and the "attachment of the right
alone does not guarantee a defendant the assistance of counsel.,
70
Four Justices in Patterson dissented, along philosophical lines that
continue to divide the Court. Justice Blackmun, writing for himself, simply
would have held: "[A]fter formal adversary proceedings against a defendant
have been commenced, the Sixth Amendment mandates that the defendant
not be 'subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has
been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates [any
questioning].-' 7' In Justice Blackmun's view, "the Sixth Amendment does
not allow the prosecution to take undue advantage of any gap between the
commencement of the adversary process and the time at which counsel is
appointed for a defendant.7 2
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Marshall and Brennan, wrote more
forcefully: "The Court should not condone unethical forms of trial
preparation by prosecutors or their investigators. 73  Drawing a strong
connection between the attachment of a defendant's Sixth Amendment
rights and a prosecutor's ethical obligation as an attorney not to contact
66 Id.
67 Id. at 291.
68 See, e.g., United States v. Percy, 250 F.3d 720, 726-27 (9th Cir. 2001) (rejecting a
Sixth Amendment argument because the defendant "had not retained counsel, nor did he
indicate that he wanted the assistance of counsel").
69 United States v. Harrison, 213 F.3d 1206, 1209 (9th Cir. 2000).
70 Id.
71 Patterson, 487 U.S. at 300 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Michigan v. Jackson,
475 U.S. 625, 626 (1986); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981)).
72 Id. at 301 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
73 Id. at 301 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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represented parties without permission,74 Justice Stevens concluded that
"the Sixth Amendment right to counsel demands that a firm and
unequivocal line be drawn at the point at which adversary proceedings
commence."
75
Justice Stevens rejected the majority's distinction of Jackson as
turning on those defendants' request for counsel. In Jackson, Justice
Stevens noted that the Court "held the waiver invalid even though the
appointed law firm had not yet received notice of the appointment and the
defendant had not yet been informed that a law firm had been appointed to
represent him."7 6 Consequently, no true attorney-client relationship had
developed for the Court to protect beyond the attachment of the defendants'
right to that counsel. Justice Stevens thus distinguished defendants whose
Sixth Amendment rights have attached from pre-charge suspects in the
Fifth Amendment context by focusing upon the Court's previous use of
"strong language to emphasize the significance of the formal
commencement of adversary proceedings., 77 This strong language "would
support the view that additional protection should automatically attach the
moment the formal proceedings begin., 78  Instead, Justice Stevens
concluded, the majority incorrectly equated "the purported waiver of
counsel in this case ... with that of an unindicted suspect.
79
The majority's holding in Patterson, requiring defendants to invoke
their right to counsel for the right to become operative, may rest in the
majority's view that the attorney-client relationship offers little
constitutional value during pretrial interrogation. And, the Court may have
revealed this view in its rejection of the defendant's second argument in
Patterson-that Miranda warnings did not support a waiver of his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. 80
In rejecting the defendant's argument that, under Johnson v. Zerbst,8' a
Sixth Amendment waiver should require a more informative catechism than
Miranda warnings, the Court explained:
74 See, e.g., id. at 301 n.1 (discussing various disciplinary rules limiting attorney contact
with represented parties).
71 Id. at 303.
76 Id. at 302 n.2.
7 Id. at 303.
78 Id. at 303-04.
" Id. at 305.
80 Id. at 292 (majority opinion).
81 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (holding that a valid waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel entails "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege").
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While our cases have recognized a "difference" between the Fifth Amendment and
Sixth Amendment rights to counsel, and the "policies" behind these constitutional
guarantees, we have never suggested that one right is "superior" or "greater" than the
other, nor is there any support in our cases for the notion that because a Sixth
Amendment right may be involved, it is more difficult to waive than the Fifth
Amendment counterpart.
Instead, we have taken a more pragmatic approach to the waiver question-asking
what purposes a lawyer can serve at the particular stage of the proceedings in
question, and what assistance he [or she] could provide to an accused at that stage-to
determine the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and the type of
warnings and procedures that should be required before a waiver of that right will be
recognized.
82
The Court thus reviewed the "spectrum ' 83 of assistance that counsel
can provide during criminal proceedings, and concluded:
The State's decision to take an additional step and commence formal adversarial
proceedings against the accused does not substantially increase the value of counsel to
the accused at questioning, or expand the limited purpose that an attorney serves when
the accused is questioned by authorities .... [W]e do not discern a substantial
difference between the usefulness of a lawyer to a suspect during custodial
interrogation, and his value to an accused at postindictment questioning.
8 4
Indeed, the Court noted, "an attorney's role at questioning is relatively
limited., 85  Therefore, "[b]ecause the role of counsel at questioning is
relatively simple and limited, we see no problem in having a waiver
procedure at that stage which is likewise simple and limited,',8 6 such as a
Miranda waiver.
87
Justice Stevens rejected the majority's view that defense counsel plays
an equally "simple" role during questioning in either a Fifth or a Sixth
Amendment setting, because "important differences separate the two. ' 88
First, "[o]nly after a formal accusation has 'the
[G]overnment... committed itself to prosecute, and only then [have] the
adverse positions of the [G]overnment and defendant ... solidified."' 89
Second, the "indictment also presumably signals the [G]ovemment's
conclusion that it has sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case. As
a result, any further interrogation can only be designed to buttress the
82 Patterson, 487 U.S. at 297-98 (footnote omitted).
83 Id. at 298.
84 Id. at 298-99.
85 Id. at 300 n.13.
86 Id. at 300.
87 Id. at 296.
88 Id. at 305-06 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
89 Id. at 306 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (first alteration in original) (quoting Kirby v.
Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972)).
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[G]ovemment's case; authorities are no longer simply attempting to solve a
crime."
90
In this context, Justice Stevens viewed the majority's vision of defense
counsel's role as a "gross understatement of the disadvantage of proceeding
without a lawyer and an understatement of what a defendant must
understand to make a knowing waiver." 9' Indeed, Justice Stevens
"reject[ed] the premise that a lawyer's skills are more likely to sit idle at a
pretrial interrogation than at trial. 92 Rather, Justice Stevens explained:
Both events require considerable experience and expertise and I would be reluctant
to rank one over the other. Moreover .... "[T]he 'right to use counsel at the formal
trial [would be] a very hollow thing [iq, for all practical purposes, the conviction is
already assured by pretrial examination."'
93
Justice Stevens also believed that "there are ethical constraints that
prevent a prosecutor from giving legal advice to an uncounseled
adversary, 94 and that "the Miranda warnings themselves are a species of
legal advice that is improper when given by the prosecutor after
indictment., 95 Justice Stevens noted that "there are good reasons why such
advice is deemed unethical' 96:
First, the offering of legal advice may lead an accused to underestimate the
prosecuting authorities' true adversary posture .... Second, the adversary posture of
the parties, which is not fully solidified until formal charges are brought, will
inevitably tend to color the advice offered .... Finally, . . . advice offered by a
lawyer (or his or her agents) with such an evident conflict of interest cannot help but
create a public perception of unfairness and unethical conduct.
97
Patterson, therefore, is significant both as a firm turn away from
Jackson's hint at a broad Sixth Amendment and as a sign of the Court's
view that counsel does not play an especially valuable role during post-
charge interrogations. Nevertheless, Patterson likely has affected many
defendants minimally, since in many jurisdictions defendants are appointed
counsel promptly after a formal charge, leaving little practical window of
opportunity under Patterson.9 8  In McNeil v. Wisconsin,99 however, the
9) Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
9' Id. at 307-08.
92 Id. at 308 n.5.
93 Id. (alteration in original).
94 Id. at 309.
95 Id.
96 Id.
9' Id. at 309-10.
98 Cf Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 668-69 & nn.7-9 (2002) (identifying states that
provide counsel to defendants automatically upon the filing of a charge, even on minor
offenses).
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Court applied its developing philosophy of a limited Sixth Amendment
right to counsel to a defendant whose right to counsel both has attached and
been invoked.
3. McNeil v. Wisconsin: An "Offense Specific" Sixth Amendment Surfaces
The Supreme Court framed the legal issue in McNeil as "whether an
accused's invocation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel during a
judicial proceeding constitutes an invocation of his Miranda right to
counsel."' 00 Yet, in answering this question in the negative, the Court
revealed a broader, policy-based concern over guaranteeing counsel to
assist a defendant during a wide range of law enforcement interrogation,
absent an express request for counsel of the sort required to invoke the Fifth
Amendment right under Miranda.
In McNeil, the defendant was arrested in Nebraska for armed robbery
charges arising out of Wisconsin. 10 1 Before Wisconsin deputy sheriffs
transported the defendant from Nebraska to Milwaukee County, Wisconsin,
they attempted to question the defendant after advising him of his Miranda
rights.10 2 The defendant refused to speak, but did not request counsel.
10 3
Once in Wisconsin, the defendant had a bail hearing on the robbery charge,
at which the local public defender office represented the defendant.
10 4
After the bail hearing, a Milwaukee County detective approached the
defendant regarding a murder and related crimes in Racine County,
Wisconsin, which the detective was investigating. 0 5 The detective advised
the defendant of his Miranda rights, after which the defendant did not deny
knowledge of the murder, but denied involvement. 0 6 Over the next four
days, however, the detective twice returned with detectives from Racine
County to re-interview the defendant about the murder.'0 7  On each
occasion, the defendant, after again receiving Miranda warnings, implicated
himself in the murder and detailed the crimes. 0 8 The day after the final
interview, the defendant was charged with the Racine County crimes,
" 501 U.S. 171 (1991).






106 Id. at 173-74.




transported to Racine County, and convicted after the court admitted the
defendant's statements at trial.10 9
On appeal, the defendant argued that his courtroom appearance with
counsel on the Milwaukee County charges invoked his Miranda right to
counsel, which under Edwards and Jackson invalidated his subsequent
Miranda waivers when he was questioned about the Racine County
crimes.' 10 The Supreme Court rejected the defendant's position.
No one in McNeil disputed that the defendant's appearance with
counsel at his bail hearing fully "invoked" his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel on the Milwaukee County charges."' But, in dismissing any claim
that the defendant's invoked right to counsel on the Milwaukee County
charges alone prohibited questioning on the Racine County charges, the
Court announced: "The Sixth Amendment right.., is offense specific." '112
The Court acknowledged that the Fifth Amendment "Edwards rule... is
not offense specific: Once a suspect invokes the Miranda right to counsel
for interrogation regarding one offense, he may not be reapproached
regarding any offense unless counsel is present."'1 13 By contrast, "just as the
[Sixth Amendment] right is offense specific, so also its Michigan v. Jackson
effect of invalidating subsequent waivers in police-initiated interviews is
offense specific.
1 14
The Court, however, viewed the defendant as "seek[ing] to prevail by
combining the two," '115 in that his invocation of his offense specific Sixth
Amendment rights on the Milwaukee County charges right also invoked his
non-offense specific Fifth Amendment rights as to the Racine County
crimes.' 16 This contention the Court considered "false as a matter of fact
and inadvisable (if even permissible) as a contrary-to-fact presumption of
policy."",17
First, the Court explained that the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to
counsel maintain very distinct functions:
The purpose of the Sixth Amendment counsel guarantee.., is to "protec[t] the
unaided layman at critical confrontations" with his "expert adversary," the
government, after "the adverse positions of government and defendant have
solidified" with respect to a particular alleged crime. The purpose of the Miranda-
109 Id.
"1O See id.
.. Id. at 175.
112 Id.
' Id. at 177.
114 Id. at 175.
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Edwards guarantee, on the other hand.., is to protect quite a different interest: the
suspect's "desire to deal with the police only through counsel ...." This is in one
respect narrower than the interest protected by the Sixth Amendment guarantee
(because it relates only to custodial interrogation) and in another respect broader
(because it relates to interrogation regarding any suspected crime and attaches
whether or not the "adversarial relationship" produced by a pending prosecution has
yet arisen). 118
Indeed, the Court noted, "[t]o invoke the Sixth Amendment interest is,
as a matter of fact, not to invoke the Miranda-Edwards interest, ' 19 since
"[o]ne might be quite willing to speak to the police without counsel present
concerning many matters, but not the matter under prosecution.""12 The
Court acknowledged the practical likelihood that charged defendants would
not wish to face questioning without counsel. 121 But, "the likelihood that a
suspect would wish counsel to be present is not the test for the applicability
of Edwards."122 Rather, in the Court's view, only an actual expression of
this wish invokes the Edwards rule.
1 23
The Court rejected the defendant's argument that Jackson
"contradict[s] the foregoing distinction,"1 24 finding that "to the contrary, it
rests upon it.' 125 The Court noted that in Jackson it did not find that the
defendants' request for counsel constituted a Miranda-Edwards expression,
but rather "that it did not have to, since the relevant question was not
whether the Miranda 'Fifth Amendment' right had been asserted, but
whether the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had been waived. 126 Thus,
"Jackson implicitly rejects any equivalence in fact between invocation of
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the expression necessary to
trigger Edwards." 
127
Second, the Court concluded that "sound policy' ' 28 does not support
construing an invocation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel on one
offense as invoking the Fifth Amendment right to counsel as to other
offenses. The defendant's "proposed rule has only insignificant
advantages."' ' 29  But, the Court believed, this rule "would. . . seriously
118 Id. at 177-78 (citations omitted).













impede effective law enforcement,"' 30 because "most persons in pretrial
custody for serious offenses would be unapproachable by police officers
suspecting them of involvement in other crimes, even though they have not
expressed any unwillingness to be questioned.'
' 31
The Court's emphasized this counterproductive function that, in its
view, counsel plays during interrogations as justifying a limited, offense-
specific role for counsel under the Sixth Amendment, absent a specific
request for counsel's aid:
Since the ready ability to obtain uncoerced confessions is not an evil but an
unmitigated good, society would be the loser. Admissions of guilt resulting from
valid Miranda waivers "are more than merely 'desirable'; they are essential to
society's compelling interest in finding, convicting and punishing those who violate
the law."
132
Justice Stevens dissented forcefully again, with Justices Marshall and
Blackmun joining. Justice Stevens asserted that "[t]he Court's opinion
demeans the importance of the right to counsel," reflecting "a preference for
an inquisitorial system that regards the defense lawyer as an impediment
rather than a servant to the cause of justice."'
' 33
Justice Stevens divided his opinion into three main arguments. First,
Justice Stevens argued that the majority's "parsimonious 'offense-specific'
description of the right to counsel"' 134 ignores commonsense understandings
of the meaning and scope of the constitutional right to counsel. While
lawyers and judges may understand the finer distinctions between
invocation of the Fifth or Sixth Amendment right to counsel, Justice Steven
wrote, most lay-persons do not. The majority "cannot explain away the
commonsense reality that petitioner in this case could not have known that
his invocation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was restricted to the
Milwaukee County offense, given that investigations.., were concurrent
and conducted by overlapping personnel."'
' 35
Second, Justice Stevens observed that the Court's offense-specific
characterization of the right to counsel ignores the historical understanding
of the attomey-client relationship, especially in our system of criminal
justice.' 36 Justice Stevens explained that long-standing professional norms
recognize that an attorney-client relationship in a criminal case "is as broad
as the subject matter that might reasonably be encompassed by negotiations
130 Id.
3 ' Id. at 181.
132 Id. (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986)).
133 Id. at 183 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
134 Id. at 184.
131 Id. at 186.
136 See id. at 187.
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for a plea bargain or the contents of a presentence report."' 137 A doctrinal
construction of the Sixth Amendment to something less than the
profession's long-developed understanding of the relationship guaranteed
by the amendment "is both unrealistic and invidious. ' 38
Finally, Justice Stevens opined that "the offense-specific limitation on
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel can only generate confusion in the
law,"' 139 as "the Court's new rule can only dim the 'bright line' quality of
prior cases such as Edwards v. Arizona... and Michigan v. Jackson."'
140
Perhaps foreseeing the ultimate point of an offense-specific Sixth
Amendment standard, Justice Stevens presciently commented: "I trust that
its boundaries will not be patterned after the Court's double jeopardy
jurisprudence."
' 141
4. Texas v. Cobb: Sixth Amendment, Meet Blockburger
In December 1993, Lindsey Owens, a resident of Walker County,
Texas, reported that his house had been burglarized and his wife and
sixteen-month-old daughter were missing. 142 In February 1994, the police
received an anonymous tip that Raymond Cobb, a seventeen-year-old who
lived across the street from the Owens residence, was involved in the
burglary. 143  When the police questioned Cobb, he denied any
involvement.144  In July 1994, however, while under arrest for another
offense, Cobb confessed to burglarizing the Owens residence, but he
continued to deny any knowledge of the wife's and daughter's
disappearance. 145  Cobb was indicted for the burglary and appointed an
attorney. 146
While the burglary case remained pending, in August 1994 and
September 1995, the police obtained permission from Cobb's attorney to





140 Id. at 188 (citations omitted).
141 Id. at 187.
142 See Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 164-65 (2001).
143 See Cobb v. State, 93 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
144 See id.
145 See id. at 4-5; Cobb, 532 U.S. at 165.
146 See Cobb, 532 U.S. at 165.
147 See Cobb, 93 S.W.3d at 5. Cobb's attorney consented each time after being assured
that Cobb was not suspected in the disappearances. See id. Cobb and his attorney
apparently were approached by the police on occasions when Cobb was in court. See
Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (No. 99-1702) ("I don't think that [the
police] called. I think the record indicated that, in fact, [Cobb] was in court with [his
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Cobb continued to deny involvement. 48  In November 1995, however,
Cobb's father, with whom Cobb had resided in Odessa, Texas, while free
on bond, contacted the police to report that his son had confessed to killing
the wife during the burglary, 149 and burying her in the woods near the
Owens home.150 Cobb's father also reported that Cobb planned to leave
Odessa the next morning.' 5' After taking a further statement from Cobb's
father,'52 Odessa police officers secured a warrant, arrested Cobb, and
administered Miranda warnings.'53 Cobb waived his Miranda rights, and
confessed to stabbing the wife in the stomach when she confronted him
during the burglary and dragging her body to a wooded area near the
house. 154 Cobb added the following details:
I went back to the house and I saw the baby laying on its bed. I took the baby out
there and it was sleeping the whole time. I laid the baby down on the ground four or
five feet away from its mother. I went back to my house and got a flat edged shovel.
That's all I could find. Then I went back over to where they were and I started
digging a hole between them. After I got the hole dug, the baby was awake. It started
going toward its mom and it fell in the hole. I put the lady in the hole and I covered
attorney] when they asked if they could talk, and so he was there."). In addition to granting
the police express permission to question Cobb on these two occasions, "[i]n September
1995, when Cobb was returning to Odessa, [his attorney] said, here's my card and my
number. If the police try to contact you, call me." Id. at 9.
"' See Cobb, 532 U.S. at 165.
149 See id.
"o See Cobb, 93 S.W.3d at 5.
151 See Cobb v. State, 85 S.W.3d 258, 261 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
152 Cobb's father's statement read, as excerpted by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals:
About 9:00 p.m. tonight, I went to my son, Raymond Cobb's house at 1918 Golder .... We
got to Raymond's house and he came out. I told him to get in the car, that we needed to
talk .... We talked for a little while and I kept pumping him for the answers. He broke down
crying and told me how he had killed the woman. I asked him why and how. He told me he was
stoned on drugs, that he went to break into the house. He said he looked in the window and
didn't see anyone. He said the door was unlocked and he just walked in. He took a quick glance
around and didn't see anyone, so he just started gathering stuff up so he could get to them real
easy. He turned around to go back into the living room and that this woman jumped on him from
behind and was trying to choke him. He said he stabbed her and killed her. He didn't say how
many times he stabbed her. I asked him about the blood, and he said she didn't bleed. I asked
him what he done with her and he said he carried her off in the woods and buried her where no
one would find her. I asked him what about the little girl, and he just said: "She's dead." He
told me that he was by himself completely. He told me he was sorry he done it and asked me to
help him.
Id. at 261 n.2. Cobb apparently confessed to his father because, as he later told a magistrate
after his arrest and return to Walker County, "'he just couldn't live with this anymore."' Id.
at 269 n.42.
153 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Cobb was arrested and interrogated by
Odessa police officers, who were not informed by Walker County investigators that Cobb
was represented by counsel in the pending burglary case. See Cobb, 93 S.W.3d at 5.
154 See Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 165-66 (2001).
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them up. I remember stabbing a different knife I had in the ground where they were.
I was crying right then.
155
Cobb was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death.'
15 6
On appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed. 157  The
court found that Cobb's right to counsel had attached under Michigan v.
Jackson,5 8 when counsel was appointed on the burglary case.' 59 The court
further concluded that because the capital murder charges were "factually
interwoven with the burglary" on which Cobb was represented for Sixth
Amendment purposes, Cobb's right to counsel had attached to the capital
murder offenses when it attached on the burglary charge.
160
On the State of Texas's appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, five Justices
disagreed with the Texas court. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice
Rehnquist began by emphasizing that "our decision in McNeil v.
Wisconsin... meant what it said .... [T]he Sixth Amendment right to
counsel is 'offense specific."" 6' Accordingly, the Court rejected the post-
McNeil approach of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and other federal
and state courts that McNeil's offense-specific definition includes "crimes
that are 'factually related' to the charged offense."' 162 Cobb argued that
Brewer v. Williams' 63 and Maine v. Moulton'64 supported this related-
offenses approach, but the Court concluded that "the Moulton Court did not
address the question,"' 165 and to the extent that Brewer implicitly may have,
"[c]onstitutional rights are not defined by inferences from opinions which
did not address the question at issue.'
166
The Court further rejected Cobb's argument that a "parade of
horribles" would follow from a narrow definition of the Sixth
"' Id. at 166.
156 See id.; TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(7)(A) (Vernon 2003 & Supp. 2008)
(addressing murder of more than one person during the same criminal transaction).
117 See Cobb, 93 S.W.3d at 3.
"' 475 U.S. 625 (1986).
9 See Cobb, 93 S.W.3d at 6.
160 Id.
161 Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 164 (2001) (citation omitted).
62 Id. at 168 & n.1 (citing United States v. Covarrubias, 179 F.3d 1219, 1223-24 (9th
Cir. 1999); United States v. Melgar, 139 F.3d 1005, 1013 (4th Cir. 1998); United States v.
Doherty, 126 F.3d 769, 776 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Arnold, 106 F.3d 37, 41 (3rd
Cir. 1997); United States v. Williams, 993 F.2d 451, 457 (5th Cir. 1993); Commonwealth v.
Rainwater, 681 N.E.2d 1218, 1229 (Mass. 1997); In re Pack, 616 A.2d 1006, 1010-11 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1992)).
163 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
"6 474 U.S. 159 (1985).
165 Cobb, 532 U.S. at 170.
166 Id. at 169.
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Amendment's offense-specific right, noting that Cobb had offered no
evidence of these deleterious consequences "in those jurisdictions that have
not enlarged upon McNeil.'' 167 Moreover, the Court observed, Cobb "fails
to appreciate the significance of two critical considerations."' 168  One was
that "the Constitution does not negate society's interest in the ability of the
police to talk to witnesses and suspects, even those who have been charged
with other offenses."1 69  In this respect, the Court reiterated its view in
McNeil that "'the ready ability to obtain uncoerced confessions is not an
evil but an unmitigated good.""17 0  The other consideration was that the
police still will be subject to the requirements of Miranda when questioning
represented suspects, and Miranda warnings will protect suspects' right
against compulsory self-incrimination. 171
Nevertheless, the Court recognized that "in other contexts ... the
definition of an 'offense' is not necessarily limited to the four comers of the
charging instrument.' ' 72  The Court concluded that "[we see no
constitutional difference between the meaning of the term 'offense' in the
contexts of double jeopardy and of the right to counsel." 173 Therefore, the
Court held that "offense" in the Sixth Amendment should be defined by the
Fifth Amendment Blockburger test: "[W]here the same act or transaction
constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be
applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether
each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does
not."
174
67 Id. at 171.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 171-72.
170 Id. at 172 (quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181 (1991)).
171 Id. at 171. Indeed, to the extent that oral argument reveals anything of an individual
Justice's actual views, it is worth noting that during oral argument in Cobb, one Justice
referred to the ongoing protection of Miranda as the State's "best argument." Transcript of
Oral Argument at 16, Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (No. 99-1702) ("[Y]our best argument seems to be
that you don't have to recognize a Sixth Amendment right here because there's going to be,
as there was in this case, an adequate warning that one doesn't have to speak, and an
adequate Fifth Amendment opportunity to get a lawyer, probably the same one, but in any
case to get a lawyer prior to the commencement or continuation of any interrogation.").
During argument by counsel for Cobb, moreover, one or more Justices repeatedly questioned
why Cobb was not adequately protected by Miranda, including the Fifth Amendment right to
counsel under Miranda. See id. at 29-30, 40-44; see also Cobb, 532 U.S. at 171 n.2
(asserting that "the dissenters give short shrift to the Fifth Amendment's role (as expressed
in Miranda and Dickerson) in protecting a defendant's right to consult with counsel before
talking to police").
172 Cobb, 532 U.S. at 173.
M7 Id.
174 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
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In this sense, we could just as easily describe the Sixth Amendment as "prosecution
specific," insofar as it prevents discussion of charged offenses as well as offenses that,
under Blockburger, could not be the subject of a later prosecution. And, indeed, the
text of the Sixth Amendment confines its scope to "all criminal prosecutions."175
Since under Texas law burglary and capital murder were not the same
offense, 17 6 "the Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not bar police from
interrogating [Cobb] regarding the murders, and [his] confession was
therefore admissible."
177
Three of the five Justices in the majority-Justices Kennedy, Scalia
and Thomas-concurred in a brief but strongly-worded opinion by Justice
Kennedy. 178 This group directly challenged Jackson as a preventative rule
independent from Miranda and its progeny. They focused on the
constitutional need to ensure only that the police do not undermine a
suspect's voluntary decision whether to speak with the authorities, not to
prevent a suspect from exercising that choice at all. 179 Justice Kennedy
wrote:
The Miranda rule, and the related preventative rule of Edwards v.
Arizona ... serve to protect a suspect's voluntary choice not to speak outside his
lawyer's presence. The parallel rule announced in Jackson, however, supersedes the
suspect's voluntary choice to speak with investigators.
We ought to question the wisdom of a judge-made preventative rule to potect a
suspect's desire not to speak when it cannot be shown that he had that intent.
... Cobb, 532 U.S. at 173 n.3.
176 See id. at 174; see also Cobb v. State, 85 S.W.3d 258, 265 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)
(concluding that "burglary and capital murder are clearly not the 'same' offense").
171 Cobb, 532 U.S. at 174. Although Cobb's conviction and death sentence were
affirmed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals after remand from the U.S. Supreme
Court, see Cobb, 85 S.W.3d at 259, Cobb no longer remains on death row. Cobb was only
seventeen years old at the time of the murders. Consequently, following the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), which banned the execution of
individuals less than eighteen years of age at the time they commit a capital crime, Texas
Governor Rick Perry commuted Cobb's sentence to life imprisonment. See Cobb v. Dretke,
138 Fed. App'x. 702, 703 (5th Cir. 2005) (dismissing Cobb's petition for a certificate of
appealability as moot because the petition challenged only Cobb's sentence, and "Governor
Perry has granted him the relief that he requested"). Because the Supreme Court found that
Cobb's Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not extend to the interrogation about the
homicides, the Court did not reach the State of Texas's alternative argument that Cobb had
validly waived that right. See Cobb, 532 U.S. at 167.
118 See Cobb, 532 U.S. at 174 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
171 See id. at 176-77.
"' Id. at 175-76.
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Although not explicitly suggesting that pretrial interrogations no
longer should be viewed as a "critical stage" of the proceedings for Sixth
Amendment purposes, Justice Kennedy asked:
[T]he acceptance of counsel at an arraignment or similar proceeding only begs the
question: acceptance of counsel for what? It is quite unremarkable that a suspect
might want the assistance of an expert in the law to guide him through hearings and
trial, and the attendant complex legal matters that might arise, but nonetheless might
choose to give on his own a forthright account of the events that occurred. A court-
made rule that prevents a suspect from even making this choice serves little purpose,
especially given the regime of Miranda and Edwards.
181
The dissent was written by Justice Breyer, with Justices Stevens,
Souter, and Ginsburg joining.'8 2  Justice Breyer began by reviewing
"[s]everal basic background principles"'18 3 to the Sixth Amendment:
First, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel plays a central role in ensuring the
fairness of criminal proceedings in our system of justice. Second, the right attaches
when adversary proceedings ... begin. Third, once this right attaches, law
enforcement officials are required, in most circumstances, to deal with the defendant
through counsel rather than directly, even if the defendant has waived his Fifth
Amendment rights. 
184
Justice Breyer then moved to "the particular aspect of the right here at
issue"'85-the limits on the requirement that the police communicate with a
charged defendant through counsel. Justice Breyer acknowledged that the
right is offense-specific and thus "'cannot be invoked once for all future
prosecutions,' and it does not forbid 'interrogation unrelated to the
charge."''18 6  But, he noted, "[t]he definition of these words is not self-
evident,"18 7 and "[w]e should answer this question in light of the Sixth
Amendment's basic objectives ... ,,8 In Justice Breyer's view, the
majority's "unnecessarily technical definition undermines Sixth
Amendment protections while doing nothing to further effective law
enforcement."1
89
Justice Breyer did not find the same solace that the majority did in the
Miranda rule, as he and the other dissenters viewed the Sixth Amendment
"81 Id. at 177.
82 Id. at 177 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
183 Id.
184 Id. (citations omitted).
"' Id. at 178.
186 Id. (quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175-76 (1991)).
187 Id.
"'8 Id. at 179.
189 Id.
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as independent of the Fifth Amendment's protections.1 90 Under the Sixth
Amendment, Justice Breyer explained, "the police may not force a suspect
who has asked for legal counsel to make a critical legal choice without the
legal assistance that he has requested and that the Constitution
guarantees."1 91 Justice Breyer noted that his rule does not, as Justice
Kennedy's concurrence argued, prevent a suspect from choosing whether to
speak with the police, even without counsel's assistance, as a defendant
may initiate communication with the police. Here, however, the police
initiated the communication with Cobb, which required him to elect to
speak without the benefit of counsel. 192
Justice Breyer opined further that Blockburger does not provide a
satisfactory answer. Not only does application of the Blockburger
definition of offense compress the scope of the right to counsel to less than
what the Court previously had recognized in Brewer and Moulton, 193 but the
test "has proved extraordinarily difficult to administer in practice,"' 94 and
its application has divided even the Supreme Court.1 95 Although not
"perfectly clear,' '1 96 the "closely related" rule adopted by the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals and employed by numerous lower courts in one form or
another "comports with common sense, is far easier to apply than that of the
majority," and "is consistent with this Court's assumptions in previous
cases."' 197 Here, under this standard, "[t]he relatedness of the crimes is well
illustrated by the impossibility of questioning Cobb about the murders
without eliciting admissions about the burglary.' 9 8  Thus, "[t]he police
officers ought to have spoken to Cobb's counsel before questioning
Cobb."'199
C. THE BREADTH OF PA TTERSON AND COBB
The Supreme Court's Patterson-Cobb framework clarifies several
aspects of its view on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel during pretrial
interrogation.
. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is not self-executing
190 Id. at 181.
'9' Id. at 180.
192 See id. at 181-82.
19' See id. at 182-85.
194 Id. at 185.
195 See id. (citing United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 697-700, 716-20 (1993)
(Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia, J.)).
196 Id. at 187 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
197 Id.
19' Id. at 187-88.
199 Id. at 188.
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upon constitutional "attachment." Rather, before law
enforcement's dealings with a defendant must pass through
counsel, the defendant's interest in counsel must be invoked,
either by affirmative request, or by the actual appearance or
appointment of counsel. This requirement remains in place
even when interrogation, a "critical stage" of the proceeding,
has been initiated by the State. z00
" Short of Sixth Amendment "invocation," the defendant's free
will remains the critical focus of the Court's inquiry: whether
the defendant made a voluntary choice to proceed without
counsel into questioning, not whether that choice was
counseled.
* Even once the Sixth Amendment right to counsel has
"attached" and been "invoked," the scope of that right is
defined, not by recognized understandings of the resulting
attorney-client relationship, but by the four-corners of the
charging instrument that the prosecution has chosen to file.
Absent interrogation that is directed at this charging
instrument, the Court again will inquire only whether the
defendant's choice to speak with the authorities was voluntary.
The Patterson-Cobb framework thus substantially minimizes the value
of an attorney's advice to defendant decision-making, at least in the
interrogation context, even when Sixth Amendment interests have
attached-a position from which the Court appears disinclined to retreat.20
200 On October 1, 2008, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Montejo v. Louisiana,
No. 07-1529, which presents this question: "When an indigent defendant's right to counsel
has attached and counsel has been appointed, must the defendant take additional affirmative
steps to 'accept' the appointment in order to secure the protections of the Sixth Amendment
and preclude police-initiated interrogation without counsel present?" U.S. Supreme Court,
No. 07-01529 Question Presented, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/qp/07-01529qp.pdf (last
visited Mar. 10, 2009). If the Court answers this question in the affirmative, the mere
appointment of counsel would not suffice to "invoke" the right to counsel under Patterson.
After oral argument, the Court asked the parties to submit briefs on the question of whether
Michigan v. Jackson should be overruled. SCOTUS Blog, Montejo Order,
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/03/montejo-order-3-27-09.pdf (last
visited Mar. 29, 2009). In the U.S. Government's brief as amicus curiae, U.S. Solicitor
General Elena Kagan argued that "Michigan v. Jackson was incorrectly decided and has
been undermined by recent precedent. The decision therefore should be overruled." Brief
for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Overruling of Michigan v. Jackson at 1,
Montejo v. Louisiana, No. 07-1529 (U.S. Apr. 14, 2009), available at
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/04/us-amicus-in-montejo-4- 14-
09.pdf.
201 See Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 128 S. Ct. 2578, 2584-87 (2008) (reaffirming that
Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches upon initiation of adversary judicial
proceedings).
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The resulting potential breadth of Patterson and Cobb may not require
tremendous imagination. Of the many cases applying Patterson and Cobb,
however, two cases distinctly illustrate their full breadth: United States v.
Spruill,202 and United States v. Avants. 20 3 Both cases quite literally, but also
quite logically, apply the lessons of Patterson and Cobb to reject Sixth
Amendment right-to-counsel claims-claims to counsel that, absent
Patterson and Cobb, likely would have struck many as rock solid.
1. No Right to Counsel Even When the Government Calls a Lawyer for You
On December 13, 2000, Rodney Spruill was indicted by a federal
grand jury on charges relating to a child prostitution ring.2 °4 On January 11,
2001, the Chicago Police Department arrested Spruill on the indictment and
held him overnight.2 °5 At about 7:00 a.m. the next morning, two FBI
Agents transported Spruill to the FBI's main office in Chicago.2 °6 The
agents did not ask Spruill questions during the trip, nor did Spruill say
anything.207 At the FBI office, Spruill was advised of the charges against
him and a co-conspirator, and after waiving his Miranda rights, Spruill
acknowledged some awareness of the prostitution ring, but implicated his
co-conspirator, and in later interviews that day implicated other
individuals.
208
During this time, the court scheduled an initial appearance for Spruill
at 5:20 p.m. under Illinois's "seventeen-hour rule," under which the
Government must present a defendant for an initial appearance within
seventeen hours after arrest.209 The local U.S. Attorney's Office contacted
the federal defender' office to notify them of Spruill's arrest and scheduled
an appearance, for which a specific federal defender was assigned.210 The
federal defender arranged with the assigned Assistant U.S. Attorney
(AUSA) to meet with Spruill at 5:00 p.m. for an interview prior to the
initial appearance.211
202 296 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 2002).
203 278 F.3d 510 (5th Cir. 2002).
204 Spruill, 296 F.3d at 583; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2422(a) (2006) (coercion and
enticement to engage in prostitution); id. § 2423(a) (transportation of minors with intent to
engage in criminal sexual activity).









As 5:00 p.m. approached, the agents advised Spruill that he had one
last chance to revise his story or else his existing statement would be
memorialized and given to the prosecutors.21 2 Spruill stated that he wanted
to tell the truth about the prostitution ring, but with the seventeen-hour
deadline at hand, the agents needed Spruill to waive his right to an initial
appearance. 1 3 Spruill agreed, declined another advisement that he had the
21right to consult with counsel, and signed a waiver.14 The AUSA and
federal defender were advised that the initial appearance would need to be
rescheduled because Spruill wanted to cooperate and had signed a
waiver. The federal defender "expressed concern" to the AUSA that
Spruill had waived his right to an initial appearance without the benefit of
his assigned counsel.21 6 That night, Spruill admitted his role in the
prostitution ring.217
On January 15, 2001, Spruill was arraigned and formally appointed
counsel.21 8  Spruill moved to suppress his confession on the Sixth
Amendment grounds. 219 The District Court denied this motion, and upon
Spruill's conditional guilty plea, sentenced Spruill to fifty-seven months in
220prison.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that
Spruill's Sixth Amendment right to counsel had "attached" with his
indictment, and that his interrogation constituted a "critical stage" of the
proceedings.22' The court, however, moved quickly to Patterson to
question whether Spruill's right to counsel, although "attached," had been
"invoked., 222 The court summarized Spruill's position on appeal:
Spruill argues that while he did not verbally invoke his right to counsel, his right to
counsel was implicitly "asserted" when an attorney from the public defender's
office ... was assigned by the federal defender's office to be his counsel at his initial
appearance. Spruill contends that because of this implicit "assertion," his subsequent
waiver of his right to counsel upon signing his confession was invalid.
2 2 3
212 Id.








221 Id. at 585-86 (internal quotations omitted).
222 Id. at 586.
223 id.
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The court rejected Spruill's argument, concluding that Michigan v.
Jackson "does not substantiate Spruill's claims. 224
The court observed that while Jackson identified the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel as "an abstract right' 225 that does not depend on the
defendant's assertion of the right, "the [Supreme] Court put this abstract
right into focus through analogy to the Fifth Amendment context where the
assertion of the right to counsel made by a defendant must be an expression
of the 'defendant's desire to deal with the police only through counsel.'
226
Patterson "further illuminated ' 227 this Fifth Amendment focus to Sixth
Amendment rights, and made clear:
[T]he assertion of the right by an affirmative request for counsel is a necessary step
in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence .... The mere appointment of counsel, without
the invocation of that right, simply does not constitute the assertion of the Sixth
Amendment when the defendant has previously waived his right to counsel.
228
Spruill therefore illustrates what Patterson appears to hold: the Sixth
Amendment largely leaves to the defendant the decision whether he or she
should have counsel during a critical stage of the pretrial proceedings. So
long as the choice is voluntary, the Sixth Amendment remains unconcerned
that the defendant did not have the aid of counsel during a post-charge
interrogation.
2. The Right to Counsel Changes with the Courthouse
In 1966, Ben Chester White, an elderly Afican-American
sharecropper, was found murdered in a national forest in Mississippi.
229
Following a police investigation, Ernest Henry Avants and two other men
were indicted in state court for Mr. White's murder.230 Avants obtained
counsel and was released on bond.231  During this time, the FBI was
investigating the murder of a Mississippi civil rights worker who was killed
by a car bomb, and in early 1967, two FBI agents went to Avants's home to
interview him about the civil rights worker's death. 32 The FBI agents
confirmed with Avants that he had a pending state murder case and was
represented by counsel, and after the agents read Miranda warnings to
Avants, he stated that he did not wish to have an attorney during the
224 Id.
225 Id. (internal quotation omitted).
226 Id. (quoting Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 626 (1986)).
227 Id.
228 Id. at 587.






233interview. The FBI agents asked about the status of Avants's murder
case, and during the ensuing conversation Avants said, "'[y]eah, I shot
[him], but before I shot him [a co-defendant] had already shot him with a
carbine, had emptied the full magazine of 15 rounds into him before I shot
him. I blew his head off with a shotgun.'
234
In the late 1960s, a state jury acquitted Avants of murder.235 In 2000,
however, a federal grand jury indicted Avants for the same murder of Mr.
White.236 The Government sought to use Avants's 1967 statements to the
FBI agents as evidence, but Avants moved to suppress the statements,
arguing the FBI had violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by
interviewing him about his state-murder charge without his attorney
present.237 The District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi
granted Avants's motion, and the Government appealed.238
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals noted both that Avants's right to
counsel had fully attached and been invoked with respect to the state charge
under Michigan v. Jackson,239 and that except for a jurisdictional element,
the Mississippi and federal murder statutes "are virtually identical. 24 °
Nevertheless, the court invoked the "dual sovereignty doctrine," which
holds that "a defendant's conduct in violation of the laws of two separate
sovereigns constitutes two distinct offenses for purposes of the Double
Jeopardy Clause.",24 1 The court observed that "it seems rather clear that the
Supreme Court would require us to apply double jeopardy principles in
determining whether two offenses are the same in the Sixth Amendment
context., 242 Consequently, the Supreme Court "effectively foreclosed any
argument that the dual sovereignty doctrine does not inform the definition
of 'offense' under the Sixth Amendment. 243 And under this definition, the
court concluded, Avants's Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not




235 Id. at 514.
236 Id. The federal government had jurisdiction because Mr. White's murder was
committed on federal land. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111-12 (2006).
237 See Avants, 278 F.3d at 512.
238 Id. at 512.
239 See id. at 516.
240 Id. at 518.
241 Id. at 516 (citing Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88-93 (1985)).
242 Id. at 517.
243 Id.
244 Id. at 518. In 2003, Avants was found guilty and sentenced to life in prison, a result
affirmed by the Fifth Circuit. United States v. Avants, 367 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 2004).
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This parsimonious approach to the right to counsel seems to place
form wholly above substance. But, despite a split in the circuit courts on
this application of the double jeopardy, dual sovereignty exception to the
right to counsel, 245 the Fifth Circuit's approach appears well justified by the
reasoning of Cobb; the right to counsel does not apply to clients, but to
offenses, and only those offenses charged in the accusatory instrument or
that would be precluded as the "same offense" for double-jeopardy
purposes. Regardless of how this dual-sovereignty issue is ultimately
resolved, Cobb's constitutional separation of the right to counsel from the
attomey-client relationship that this right presumably protects is clear.
III. A JURISPRUDENCE HOSTILE TO THE ROLE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL
Patterson and Cobb work hand-in-hand to limit the importance, and
thus the scope, of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, a distinct right
from the Fifth Amendment right to counsel under Miranda, and a right that
is defined by a well-understood professional relationship between attorney
and client. This professional relationship was not conceived solely by
defense lawyers. On the contrary, this professional relationship and its
purposes are well known to the legal profession as a whole, including
prosecutors, police officers, and courts. However, by transforming the
Sixth Amendment into a right that protects offenses instead of individuals
and that permits the State to seek confessions without counsel's aid, the
Supreme Court allows law enforcement to game the Constitution and
incorrectly substitutes Fifth Amendment voluntariness for the Sixth
Amendment right to be counseled during critical decision-making.
245 At least two federal circuit courts agree with the Fifth Circuit on this issue. See
United States v. Alvarado, 440 F.3d 191, 195-99 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Coker, 433
F.3d 39, 41-47 (1st Cir. 2005). And at least one circuit court parted company. United States
v. Mills, 412 F.3d 325, 330 n.2 (2d Cir. 2005) (rejecting "the government's invitation to
follow the Fifth Circuit's lead in United States v. Avants"); cf United States v. Krueger, 415
F.3d 766, 775-78 (7th Cir. 2005) (questioning, but not deciding, whether the dual-
sovereignty doctrine should define "offense" for Sixth Amendment purposes). See Dinger,
supra note 19; Ali C. Rodriguez, Detaching Dual Sovereignty from the Sixth Amendment:
Use of the Blockburger Offense Test Does not Incorporate Double Jeopardy Doctrines, 33
NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 213 (2007); David J. D'Addio, Comment, Dual
Sovereignty and the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, 113 YALE L.J. 1991, 1992 (2004);
Charles Morrison, Comment, The Supreme Court May Have Meant What It Said, but It
Needs to Say More: A Comment on the Circuit Split Regarding the Application of the Dual




A. A FLAWED UNDERSTANDING OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
RELATIONSHIP
In Patterson, the Supreme Court defined the Sixth Amendment interest
at stake by judicially weighing "what purposes a lawyer can serve at the
particular stage of the proceedings in question, and what assistance he could
provide to an accused at that stage. 246 Concluding that "the role of counsel
at questioning is relatively simple and limited, 247 the Court embraced a
right that requires affirmative invocation to become complete and that short
of such invocation, may be waived through no more than Miranda
warnings. 248 The Court's offense-specific rulings in McNeil and Cobb can
be viewed in a similar light; the Court balanced its understanding of the
value that a lawyer can provide to a charged defendant during interrogation
against the Court's perceived harm that this assistance imparts to society's
interest in convicting guilty offenders.24 9 Striking this balance in favor of
voluntary confessions, the Court limited the Sixth Amendment right to
charged offenses.25 °
To the extent the Sixth Amendment permits such judicial consideration
of "sound policy" in appraising the value of counsel weighed against the
State's interests,2 51  the Supreme Court's policy analysis sorely
246 Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 298 (1987).
247 Id. at 299.
248 See id. at 296, 300. But see, e.g., Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975)
(holding that "[a]lthough a defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a
lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose self-representation, he should be
made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will
establish that 'he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open"' (quoting
Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942))).
249 See, e.g., McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 180-81 (1991).
250 See Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 171-75 (2001).
"' See, e.g., McNeil, 501 U.S. at 180 (justifying the offense-specific right-to-counsel rule
on "sound policy" grounds, and noting that a rule more expansively defining the right to
counsel "has only insignificant advantages," but would "seriously impede effective law
enforcement"). This methodology may be particularly curious for Justice Scalia, who often
decries judicial balancing of policy interests and valuation of constitutional rights, especially
under the Sixth Amendment. See, e.g., Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2691 (2008)
(rejecting the dissent's approach, "under which the Court would create exceptions that it
thinks consistent with the policies underlying the confrontation guarantee ... the boundaries
of the doctrine seem to us intelligently fixed so as to avoid a principle repugnant to our
constitutional system of trial by jury: that those murder defendants whom the judge
considers guilty.., should be deprived of fair-trial rights"); Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36, 62 (2004) (condemning the Court's previous "reliability" test for determining the
admissibility of testimonial hearsay because of its inherent judicial subjectivity, and arguing
that "[d]ispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to
dispensing with jury trial because the defendant is obviously guilty"); Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 499 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Justice Breyer proceeds on the
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misconceives the role and value of the attorney-client relationship during a
post-charge interrogation. During the interrogation itself, counsel often,
though not always, plays a more passive role of observational advisor to his
or her client. Nonetheless, the Court's opinions in Patterson, McNeil, and
Cobb appear to envision counsel's services at the interrogation as some sort
of 6 la carte dish, a single-serving of counsel isolated to the plate on which
it is delivered; a truly passive advisor, participating solely in the
interrogation. In Patterson, the Court made its perspective explicit:
"[D]uring postindictment questioning, a lawyer's role is rather
unidimensional: largely limited to advising his client as to what questions to
answer and which ones to decline to answer."
252
In reality, a post-charge interrogation requires very active participation
by counsel, and tremendous foresight and strategy-all equal in required
skill and diligence to the strategic mindset that law enforcement properly
will bring to the interrogation too.253  Moreover, counsel's considered
judgment will not be limited to the interrogation itself, judged in a legal and
factual vacuum; rather, counsel must consider the interrogation in the
broader context of litigating the filed charges, as well as any other charges
that may await the client, or that were filed in related or even unrelated
cases. Prior to the interrogation, therefore, counsel will negotiate the terms
and scope of the interrogation, how the interrogation may or may not be
used in future proceedings, and what if any benefit the client may realize
from agreeing to communicate with his or her prosecuting authority.
Finally, counsel will monitor the interrogation to ensure that it conforms to
these understandings and the client's current and future interests.
This comprehensive, strategic role of defense counsel is far from
unknown in the profession. On the contrary, this role reflects a long-
standing professional understanding of defense counsel's function,254 and a
erroneous and all-too-common assumption that the Constitution means what we think it
ought to mean. It does not; it means what it says."); Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 864
(1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (contending that the Court's views on "[t]he 'necessities of
trial and the adversary process' are irrelevant here, since they cannot alter the constitutional
text"); id. at 869-70 ("I have no need to defend the value of confrontation, because the Court
has no authority to question it.").
252 Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 294 n.6 (1987) (emphasis added).
253 1 can confirm this fact from more than fourteen years of criminal defense practice
experience. See id. at 307-08, 308 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing that counseling a
client through a post-charge interrogation "require[s] considerable experience and
expertise"); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION § 4-1.2 (1993) (identifying defense counsel along with the prosecutor as critical
elements to a "court properly constituted to hear a criminal case").
254 See, e.g., STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION § 4-3.6 ("Many important rights of the accused can be protected and preserved
only by prompt legal action. Defense counsel should inform the accused of his or her rights
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defense attorney who fails to approach an interrogation with a client's
interests strategically in mind likely falls well short of constitutionally
effective representation:
Representation of a criminal defendant entails certain basic duties. Counsel's
function is to assist the defendant, and hence counsel owes the client a duty of
loyalty .... From counsel's function as assistant to the defendant derive the
overarching duty to advocate the defendant's cause and the more particular duties to
consult with the defendant on important decisions and to keep the defendant informed
of important developments in the course of prosecution. Counsel also has a duty to
bring to bear such skill and knowledge as will render the trial a reliable adversarial
255
testing process.
An adversarial process as the proper test of justice is equally familiar:
American justice relies on an adversary system .... The adversary system
proceeds on the assumption that parties to a lawsuit are in the best position to
determine its scope and content in a way that will generate substantial
justice .... One consequence of this theory is that, with few exceptions, lawyers in
an adversary contest have no obligation to parties or interests other than their own
clients .... Consequently, justice, or the right result, is not the responsibility of either
lawyer .... This system is justified on the theory that, when two or more lawyers
singlemindedly pursue the interests of their individual clients, the confrontation will
lead to the most just result.
256
Of course, this understanding of defense counsel's role places a highly
strategic actor between the State and a charged defendant's confession.
However, any concern about the impact of this strategic actor on the State's
interests is wholly different in kind from-and seemingly inconsistent
with-the Supreme Court's vision of defense counsel's role as "simple and
limited., 217  Indeed, that this strategic actor sometimes will subject the
State's ability to obtain a confession to the defendant's own competing
legal interests would appear to provide all the more reason to maximize the
value of counsel's role, not to minimize it as the Supreme Court has done.
That is, unless the Sixth Amendment in fact is not meant to subject the
at the earliest opportunity and take all necessary action to vindicate such rights. Defense
counsel should consider all procedural steps which in good faith may be taken .... "); cf
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 1.3 cmt. 1, at 15 (2008) (advising that "[a] lawyer
must ... act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in
advocacy upon the client's behalf"); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 16(1) (2000) (providing that "a lawyer must.. . proceed in a manner reasonably
calculated to advance a client's lawful objectives, as defined by the client after consultation"
(emphasis added)).
255 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (citations omitted and emphasis
added).
256 Stephen Gillers, The American Legal Profession, in FUNDAMENTALS OF AMERICAN
LAW 151, 166-67 (Alan B. Morrison ed., 1996).
257 See Patterson, 487 U.S. at 300.
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State's interest in a confession to an "adversarial testing process., 258
Neither the text of the Sixth Amendment nor the Court's interpretation of
259that text supports this proposition.  Instead, the Court has resorted to an
inaccurate judicial assessment that counsel simply does little to protect a
client's interests during an interrogation, and so Sixth Amendment rights
should prove correspondingly flexible to accommodate the State's interest
in a confession. This subjective judicial perspective on counsel's value to a
defendant during post-charge interrogation should not inform this
constitutional right any more than judicial assessment of the "reliability" of
hearsay evidence should define whether confrontation serves a value worth
enforcing, 26 or whether practical modem litigation realities should inform
whether facts necessary for punishment may be treated as "sentencing"
facts not subject to Fifth and Sixth Amendment requirements.26
B. AN IMPROPER FOCUS ON THE FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO
COUNSEL IN SIXTH AMENDMENT CONTEXTS
In addition to evaluating the value of the attorney-client relationship
during a post-charge interrogation, the Court in Patterson, McNeil, and
Cobb also defined and limited the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in
light of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel under Miranda. For
example, in Patterson, the Court opined: "The fact that [defendant's] Sixth
Amendment right came into existence with his indictment ... does not
distinguish him from the preindictment interrogatee whose [Fifth
Amendment] right to counsel is in existence and available for his exercise
while he is questioned. 262  In McNeil, the Court emphasized that "[t]o
invoke the Sixth Amendment interest is, as a matter of fact, not to invoke
the Miranda-Edwards interest .... Jackson implicitly rejects any
equivalence in fact between invocation of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel and the expression necessary to trigger Edwards.,263 And in Cobb,
258 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
259 See id.; see also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237-38 (1967) ("[T]o refuse to
recognize the right to counsel for fear that counsel will obstruct the course of justice is
contrary to the basic assumptions upon which this Court has operated in Sixth Amendment
cases . . . . '[A]n attorney is merely exercising the good professional judgment he has been
taught ... to protect to the extent of his ability the rights of his client."' (quoting Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 480-81 (1966))); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964)
(noting that "[n]o system worth preserving should have to fear that if an accused is permitted
to consult with a lawyer, he will become aware of, and exercise, these rights").
260 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004); Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836
(1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
261 See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
262 Patterson, 487 U.S. at 290-91.
263 McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178-79 (1991).
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Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas outright questioned the relevance of
the Sixth Amendment preventative rule under Jackson altogether in light of
the Fifth Amendment Miranda-Edwards doctrine:
The Miranda rule, and the related preventative rule of Edwards v. Arizona serve to
protect a suspect's voluntary choice not to speak outside the lawyer's presence. The
parallel rule announced in Jackson, however, supersedes the suspect's voluntary
choice to speak with investigators.
We ought to question the wisdom of a judge-made preventative rule to protect a
suspect's desire not to speak when it cannot be shown that he had that intent.
A court-made rule that prevents a suspect from even making this choice serves little
purpose, especially given the regime of Miranda and Edwards.
264
The Court's focus on the Fifth Amendment right to counsel as the
presumptively adequate preventative rule is unfounded.26 5 Unlike the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, the Fifth Amendment right to counsel does
not exist independently of a custodial interrogation.266 Instead, the Fifth
Amendment right to counsel exists solely as a prophylactic measure to
protect a suspect's Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate him or herself
involuntarily.26 7  The Fifth Amendment itself provides no textual right to
264 Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 175-77 (2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citations
omitted).
265 See, e.g., Meredith B. Halama, Note, Loss of a Fundamental Right: The Sixth
Amendment as a Mere "Prophylactic Rule," 1998 U. ILL. L. REv. 1207, 1224, 1227
(criticizing the Supreme Court's "merger of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments," and the Sixth
Amendment's "subordination to the Fifth Amendment").
266 See Sapp v. State, 690 So. 2d 581, 584-85 (Fla. 1997) (concluding that a suspect
cannot invoke the Fifth Amendment right to counsel under Miranda if "custodial
interrogation has not begun or is not imminent," since "Miranda's safeguards were intended
to protect the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination by countering the
compulsion that inheres in custodial interrogation"); see also Alston v. Redman, 34 F.2d
1237, 1244 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1160 (1995) (holding that "the presence of
both a custodial setting and official interrogation is required to trigger the Miranda right-to-
counsel.., absent one or the other, Miranda is not implicated"); cf McNeil, 501 U.S. at 183
n.3 (expressing doubt that the Court "will allow [the Fifth Amendment right to counsel] to be
asserted initially outside the context of custodial interrogation"); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446
U.S. 291, 300 (1980) (defining interrogation under Miranda).
267 The Fifth Amendment provides, in pertinent part: "No person.. . shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself" U.S. CONST. amend. V; see Holloway
v. State, 780 S.W.2d 787, 792 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) ("Miranda counsel acts as a buffer
against state agents capable of amassing resources to extract confessions from unwilling
suspects .... [T]he promise of legal assistance is intended to counter compulsion .... The
Fifth Amendment bars only compulsory self-incrimination; it does not bar unwise
confessions."); cf New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984) (referring to Miranda
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counsel.268 In fact, even as construed in Miranda, the Fifth Amendment
does not quite afford a substantive right to counsel, but more accurately
only the right to request counsel as a condition to questioning, a request law
enforcement must honor.269 Thus, so long as law enforcement advises a
suspect of this fight, law enforcement may invite the suspect to choose
whether to proceed without counsel, and voluntariness of suspect decision-
making is assured.
Under the Sixth Amendment, by contrast, once the State commences
prosecution, the right to counsel exists for the defendant regardless of
custodial interrogation 270 because the Sixth Amendment is not merely a
judicially-created prophylactic designed to protect other constitutional
rights; the Sixth Amendment itself assures the right to counsel as a
constitutional interest.27 1 Further, the Constitution envisions a "Sixth
Amendment right to counsel [that] is much more pervasive [than the Fifth
Amendment right] because it affects the ability of the accused to assert any
other rights he might have,, 272 rights including, but far beyond, the right
against self-incrimination,273 and rights deemed essential to the realization
of a fair and just trial. 274  Indeed, for this reason, in other post-charge
settings, such as a post-indictment lineup, the prosecution must afford
warnings as "prophylactic" rules to protect the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 439 (1974) (also discussing Miranda
warnings' role as "prophylactic rules developed to protect that right [against self-
incrimination]").
268 See supra note 6.
269 See United States v. Myers, 123 F.3d 350, 359-60 (6th Cir. 1997) (rejecting the
existence of a right to appointed counsel under the Fifth Amendment); Holloway, 780
S.W.2d at 792 (referring to the "promise" of counsel under the Fifth Amendment); Daniel C.
Nester, Distinguishing Fifth and Sixth Amendment Rights to Counsel During Police
Questioning, 16 S. ILL. U. L.J. 101, 115 (1991) (discussing how "[t]he Fifth Amendment
right to counsel attaches only after the suspect has invoked the right").
270 See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
271 See Halama, supra note 265, at 1228-29 (criticizing the Supreme Court's equation of
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel and characterization of the Sixth Amendment
right as a prophylactic right). But cf Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 353 (1990)
(identifying Sixth Amendment preventative rule under Jackson and Edwards as a
prophylactic rule).
2712 Harvey, 494 U.S. at 356 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
273 See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S 159, 169 (1985) (emphasizing that the right to
counsel "safeguards the other rights deemed essential for the fair prosecution of a criminal
proceeding").
274 See id. at 168-69 (observing that "[t]he right to the assistance of counsel.., is
indispensible to the fair administration of our adversarial system of criminal justice");
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) (noting that "[t]he Sixth Amendment
recognizes the right to the assistance of counsel because it envisions counsel's playing a role
that is critical to the ability of the adversarial system to produce just results").
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counsel to the defendant, regardless of whether the defendant "invokes" this
right by requesting counsel's assistance.275 Therefore, once a defendant
acquires the right "to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense,, 276 the
defendant similarly should not need to assert that right for counsel's
presence to become a requisite condition to law enforcement questioning of
the defendant; only the defendant should position him or herself to choose
whether to proceed without counsel.
277
Yet, ironically, by making the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
offense-specific but not the Fifth Amendment right,278 the Supreme Court
embraces a broader vision of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel in the
interrogation context. For example, in McNeil, the Court asserted the
curious proposition that "[t]o invoke the Sixth Amendment interest is, as a
matter of fact, not to invoke the Miranda-Edwards interest," because "[o]ne
might be quite willing to speak to the police without counsel present
concerning many matters, but not the matter under prosecution.
279
This observation might prove true in an individual case, a
circumstance that even Justice Scalia acknowledged is not practically likely
in most cases. 280 But that it might prove true in a few, or even in many
cases, misses the constitutional point: the Sixth Amendment requires law
enforcement to presume that a charged and represented defendant wishes to
proceed only with the aid of counsel unless the defendant makes his or her
contrary wish clear by initiating the questioning. To place the burden of
asserting the need for counsel's assistance on a charged defendant, for
whom the Constitution's text guarantees that assistance, and to limit that
interest solely to the offenses with which the defendant has been charged,
275 See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237, 224 (1967) (holding that, regardless of
defendant's request, defense counsel "should have been notified of the impending [post-
indictment] lineup, and counsel's presence should have been a requisite to conduct of the
lineup, absent an 'intelligent waiver,"' because "critical confrontations of the accused by the
prosecution at pretrial proceedings ... might well settle the accused's fate and reduce the
trial itself to a mere formality"); see also Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272 (1967).
276 U.S. CONSt. amend. VI.
277 Cf Harvey, 494 U.S. at 359-60 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S.
285, 306-307 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing that "[g]iven the significance of the
initiation of formal proceedings and the concomitant shift in the relationship between the
state and the accused, I think it quite wrong to suggest that Miranda warnings-or for that
matter, any warnings offered by an adverse party-provide a sufficient basis for permitting
the undoubtedly prejudicial-and, in my view, unfair-practice of permitting trained law
enforcement personnel and prosecuting attorneys to communicate with as-of-yet
unrepresented criminal defendants").
278 See Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 684 (1988).
279 McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178 (1991).
280 See id.
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but to presume that interest without limitation to charges under an implied
Fifth Amendment right, makes no jurisprudential sense.
No sense, at least, unless one considers jurisprudential interests apart
from a neutral application of the Sixth Amendment. The Court's language
in Patterson, McNeil, and Cobb makes clear that the Justices in the majority
view the Miranda rule as an already substantial obstacle to the "unmitigated
good" of voluntary confessions.28' Rather than viewing the Sixth
Amendment as the further constitutional dividing line between when the
State may invite an un-counseled confession, even if voluntary, and when
the Constitution presumes that counsel will assist in any interrogation, these
Justices appear to see any role for counsel beyond assuring the basic
voluntariness of a confession as irrelevant to constitutional law, if not an
outright obstruction. 282  Defendant free-will predominates as the critical
inquiry, not whether the defendant has received competent legal advice.283
281 See Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 172 (2001) (quoting McNeil, 501 U.S. at 181); see
also id. at 175-77 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
282 See, e.g., id. at 175-76 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The Miranda rule, and the related
preventative rule of Edwards v. Arizona serve to protect a suspect's voluntary choice not to
speak outside his lawyer's presence. The parallel rule announced in Jackson, however,
supersedes the suspect's voluntary choice to speak with investigators .... We ought to
question the wisdom of a judge-made preventative rule to protect a suspect's desire not to
speak when it cannot be shown that he had that intent." (citations omitted)); Dickerson v.
United States, 530 U.S. 428, 449 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (commenting that the right to
counsel under Miranda incorrectly helps to assure, not that a suspect will confess only
voluntarily, but that a suspect will not confess "foolishly," an outcome that the Constitution
does not prohibit).
283 Oral argument in Montejo v. Louisiana appears to confirm this coercion-driven
understanding of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See Transcript of Oral Argument,
Montejo v. Louisiana, 2009 WL 793514 (Jan. 13, 2009) (No. 07-1529), available at 2009
WL 76296. The issue in Montejo is whether Michigan v. Jackson is triggered when a
charged defendant is appointed, but has not requested, counsel. See supra note 200. Early in
the argument, Justice Scalia queried:
I thought that the rationale of Jackson was that the confession is simply deemed to be coerced
if the defendant has expressed-has expressed-his desire to have counsel present or even to be
represented by counsel. It isn't clear that, which is already a stretch, to assume that simply
because I said, you know, I would like to have counsel, if the police continue to say, well, come
on, won't you talk to us-it's already a stretch to say it's automatically coerced.
But now you're saying, even if the defendant has never expressed even a desire to be
represented by counsel but has simply had counsel appointed, in fact even if he doesn't know
about the appointment of counsel, the-his confession is automatically deemed to be coerced.
That seems to me quite, even more extravagant than Jackson.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra, at *4. A short time later, Justice Kennedy surmised
bluntly: "[I]t seems to me... the Miranda rules give you all the protection you need." Id. at
*7-8. Justice Souter, however, subsequently highlighted the critical distinction:
[T]here is a difference between the way you are phrasing the Sixth Amendment right and the
way, for example, Justice Scalia has phrased it in his question. Justice Scalia has phrased it in
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The text of the Sixth Amendment itself, however, seems to embrace a
role for defense counsel well beyond the narrow Fifth Amendment function
of ensuring that defendants' choices are voluntary.284  The Sixth
Amendment right ensures effective counsel in the comprehensive sense of
that function that is recognized in the profession-strategically protecting a
client's substantive and procedural legal interests. 285  Yet, in no other
critical stage context has the Court so frankly limited the value of counsel
and the attorney-client relationship as in the interrogation context.286 The
terms of determining what is a coerced confession. You have phrased it in your argument in
terms of saying a fight to rely upon counsel, which is a much broader concept .... Isn't it the
case that you understand Jackson to be a broader rule than a merely no-coercion rule?
Id. at *23.
284 Indeed, the Fifth Amendment right to counsel has been viewed as so narrow in
function that defendants may not be able to assert ineffective assistance of counsel relating to
an interrogation when only the Fifth Amendment right can be claimed. See, e.g., Sweeney v.
Carter, 361 F.3d 327, 333 (7th Cir. 2004) (observing that "as far as we can tell, the Supreme
Court has not mentioned effective assistance of counsel (in the Strickland sense) and the
Fifth Amendment in the same breath"); United States v. Radford, No. Civ. A. 00-70255,
2000 WL 1137712, at *3-5 (E.D. Mich. July 7, 2000) (rejecting defendant's ineffective
assistance of counsel claim rooted in a Fifth Amendment right to counsel under Miranda);
see also Wainwright v. Tora, 455 U.S. 586, 587-88 (1982) (per curiam) (finding that to
prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must show that he or she
was constitutionally entitled to counsel when the allegedly deficient representation was
provided); United States v. Myers, 123 F.3d 350, 358-59 (6th Cir. 1997) (rejecting existence
of a right to appointed counsel under the Fifth Amendment); United States v. Zazzara, 626
F.2d 135, 137-38 (9th Cir. 1980); Brown v. United States, 551 F.2d 619, 620 (5th Cir. 1977).
Contra State v. Joseph, 128 P.3d 795, 804 (Haw. 2006) (finding that defendant, under both
the Hawaii State Constitution and the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, "had the
right to effective assistance of counsel during both the pre-Miranda and the post-Miranda
portions of the January 8 custodial interrogation").
285 See Holloway v. State, 780 S.W.2d 787, 793 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) ("Unlike the
Fifth Amendment, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel guarantees more than an
entitlement to counsel upon invocation ... [and] 'envisions counsel's playing a role that is
critical to the ability of the adversarial system to produce just results."' (quoting Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984))); supra notes 253-56 and accompanying text; cf
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967) (noting that "[tihe Framers of the Bill of
Rights envisioned a broader role for counsel than under the practice then prevailing in
England"); id. at 237-38 ("[T]o refuse to recognize the right to counsel for fear that counsel
will obstruct the course of justice is contrary to the basic assumptions upon which this Court
has operated in Sixth Amendment cases. .. . '[Aln attorney is merely exercising the good
professional judgment he has been taught . . . to protect to the extent of his ability the rights
of his client."' (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 480-81 (1966))); Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964) (noting that "[n]o system worth preserving should have to
fear that if an accused is permitted to consult with a lawyer, he will become aware of, and
exercise, these rights"); LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 6, §10, at 519 (observing that "[t]he
constitutional right to counsel.., provides the vehicle through which all other criminal
process rights are presented").
286 Cf Halama, supra note 265, at 1234 (arguing that "current Sixth Amendment
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apparent constitutional goal, which the Court embraces as an "unmitigated
good, ,281 is to encourage un-counseled--or more accurately, poorly
strategized-confessions that inevitably will compromise defendants'
bargaining and litigation position in a criminal justice system predicated on
fair plea bargaining and litigation as a means to justice. 288 The Fifth
Amendment might countenance the Court's constitutional prioritization of
voluntariness alone, but the Sixth Amendment should not.
C. THE PROPER ANALYSIS: A RELATIONAL SIXTH AMENDMENT
The Sixth Amendment, once attached, triggers a constitutionally
protected professional relationship that is presumed to place a trained
strategic actor between the State and the accused. This actor is understood
to contribute to a more fair trial, not to detract from one. 289 Rather than
permit a sliding scale of protection, therefore, contingent on the Justices'
view of the relative value of this relationship weighed against the State's
interests, the Court should frame constitutional rules around the premise of
the constitutional guarantee: that the State must "honor" the attomey-client
relationship, and thus it has "an affirmative obligation to respect and
preserve the accused's choice to seek this assistance... [and] rely on
counsel as a 'medium' between him and the State. ' 9" In the interrogation
context, these rules would be familiar, clear-cut, and predictable.
At a minimum, once the Sixth Amendment right attaches with the
initiation of adversarial proceedings, the Constitution should presume that
the defendant will proceed only with the advice of counsel. The right
should be self-executing.291 Contrary to some Justices' apparent concern
for preserving defendant autonomy to choose,292 this approach will not
force counsel upon an unwilling defendant, since a defendant still may
initiate interrogation without counsel. Rather, by prohibiting the State from
inviting the defendant to proceed with interrogation without counsel, this
constitutional rule recognizes the existence of a critical professional
relationship to our fundamental notion of a fair trial, a relationship the State
jurisprudence has lost sight of the importance of the attorney-client relationship").
287 Cobb, 532 U.S. at 172 (quoting McNeil, 501 U.S. at 181).
288 See supra notes 4-5, 8, and accompanying text.
289 See supra notes 255-56.
290 Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 171, 176 (1985).
291 See Colin E. Fritz, Comment, Patterson v. Illinois: Applying Miranda Waivers to the
Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1261, 1263, 1272 (1989) (arguing that
"the Court's decision in Patterson breaks from established constitutional precedent by
denying automatic application of counsel for postindictment interrogation").
292 See Cobb, 532 U.S. at 175-76 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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is duty-bound to respect and preserve once the State itself has formalized its
adversarial position to the defendant.293
Once the State's adversarial relationship to the defendant implicates
the Sixth Amendment, the State's constitutional obligation should recognize
that the defendant, not the indictment, assumes a constitutionally protected
professional relationship with an attorney. In the interrogation context, this
relational understanding of the Sixth Amendment entails two requirements
that depart form the Supreme Court's "offense-specific" approach adopted
in Cobb.
First, law enforcement should not initiate questioning of the defendant
outside of counsel's presence when officers know that the questions are
reasonably likely to intrude into the subject matter covered by an existing
attorney-client relationship-questions, for instance, that will prompt
disclosure of confidential facts, 294 or evidence of strategic decision-making
between client and lawyer. This rule would by no means be novel.
Lawyers in every jurisdiction operate under an essentially identical rule that
prohibits lawyers from communicating with represented parties without
their attorney's permission, all to protect the attorney-client relationship
from intrusion by adverse parties. 29  So, for example, if the police who
questioned Cobb knew that by asking him about the missing family
members, they likely would elicit confidential information about the
burglary on which Cobb was represented by counsel, the Sixth Amendment
should have prohibited this questioning, except in counsel's presence or if
Cobb had initiated the questioning.
This rule would require awareness and even some inquiry by law
enforcement before questioning a represented defendant. Yet, this rule
surely requires no more, and likely quite a bit less, than what Cobb's
technical Blockburger analysis currently requires of law enforcement.296
293 Cf Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 300-01 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(distinguishing the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel, and observing that
"'[w]hen the Constitution grants protection against criminal proceedings without the
assistance of counsel, counsel must be furnished whether or not the accused requested the
appointment of counsel' (quoting Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 513 (1962))).
294 Cf MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 1.6 (2008) (defining confidentiality).
295 See, e.g., id. 4.2 cmt. 1 ("This Rule contributes to the proper functioning of the legal
system by protecting a person who has chosen to be represented by a lawyer in a matter
against possible overreaching by other lawyers who are participating in the matter,
interference by those lawyers with the client-lawyer relationship and the uncounselled
disclosure of information relating to the representation."). Indeed, this ethical restraint goes
beyond the proposed constitutional rule, for Rule 4.2 "applies even though the represented
person initiates or consents to the communication. A lawyer must immediately terminate
communication with a person if, after commencing communication, the lawyer learns that
the person is one with whom communication is not permitted by this Rule." Id. at cmt. 3.
296 See, e.g., Cobb, 532 U.S. at 185 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (observing that "[t]he test has
[Vol. 99
A RELATIONAL SIXTH AMENDMENT
Additionally, a relational rule has the virtue of focusing law enforcement's
attention on the correct Sixth Amendment issue: whether law enforcement
questions directed at a charged defendant intrude into the attorney-client
relationship, instead of whether the questions are directed at the existing
accusatory instrument or derivative offenses under double-jeopardy
analysis. A relational rule will not preclude law enforcement questioning of
a charged defendant if the questions address topics not covered by the
attorney-client relationship. Otherwise, a phone call to the defendant's
lawyer is required for questioning to proceed.
Second, even if law enforcement's questioning of a represented
defendant does not intrude into the subject matter of the attorney-client
relationship, the Sixth Amendment still should preclude State initiation of
questioning if the setting of the interrogation necessitates counsel's
presence to maintain equal footing between established adversaries.
Principally, this component of the Sixth Amendment rule would restrict in-
custody interrogation of represented defendants outside of counsel's
presence. This rule at first blush may appear simply to carry over the
custodial interrogation focus of the Fifth Amendment. But, this rule
distinctly emphasizes equal footing in a context when the defendant already
is represented against the State, and equal footing between established
adversaries is a core value of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.297
This rule thus may extend beyond custodial questioning if the setting
isolates or leverages a represented defendant such that he or she likely could
not maintain the appropriate barriers between law enforcement and the
subject matter on which the defendant is represented. Custody, however,
has this well-documented effect. Thus, when a represented defendant is
interrogated while incarcerated by the very same authority that seeks a
confession from the defendant, the defendant's dealings with the State in
this context cannot confidently be characterized as an independent choice to
proceed without counsel, free of State interference with the existing
attorney-client relationship.
Each of these components to a relational Sixth Amendment is
predictable and clear to law enforcement. These rules, moreover, do not
privilege a represented defendant absolutely from any law enforcement
emerged as a tool in an area of our jurisprudence that the Chief Justice has described as 'a
veritable Sargasso Sea which could not fail to challenge the most intrepid judicial
navigator' (quoting Albemaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1981))).
297 See Holloway v. State, 780 S.W.2d 787, 793 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (observing that
"parity between parties is critical to prevent unfair and unjust outcomes that would be tainted
by one side's superiority"); supra note 18; see also James J. Tomkovicz, Standards for
Invocation and Waiver of Counsel in Confession Contexts, 71 IOWA L. REV. 975, 980-81
(1986) (identifying "parity" as a core value of the Sixth Amendment).
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questioning on matters beyond the attorney-client relationship or when the
defendant initiates questioning. Accordingly, the State's interest in ongoing
investigation and the opportunity to obtain voluntary confessions is
preserved. On the other hand, these rules do require the State to honor the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel as a professional relationship between a
lawyer and an individual,298 consistent with long-standing professional
norms, and not to treat defense lawyers as the constitutional representative
of an indictment and nothing more.
IV. STATE LAW MODELS: A TURN AWAY FROM COBB?
This Article does not presume that the Supreme Court is prepared to
revisit its Sixth Amendment interrogation jurisprudence, and the lower
federal courts of course must follow Supreme Court's rulings. Nonetheless,
we live in a federal system where the States remain free, as a matter of
policy or state constitutional law, to raise the floor of individual rights that
the U.S. Constitution sets.299 As Supreme Court Justice William Brennan
once explained in his seminal article, State Constitutions and the Protection
of Individual Rights:
The essential point I am making, of course, is not that the United States Supreme
Court is necessarily wrong in its interpretation of the federal Constitution, or that
ultimate constitutional truths invariably come prepackaged in the dissents .... It is
simply that the decisions of the Court are not, and should not be, dispositive of
questions regarding rights guaranteed by counterpart provisions of state
law .... Rather, state court judges, and also practitioners, do well to scrutinize
constitutional decisions by federal courts, for only if they are found to be logically
persuasive and well-reasoned, paying due regard to precedent and the policies
underlying specific constitutional guarantees, may. they properly claim persuasive
weight as guideposts when interpreting counterpart state guarantees.
300
In the years following the Patterson decision in 1988, a handful of
state courts held under state law what Justice Blackmun's dissent had
argued in Patterson: "[T]he Sixth Amendment does not allow the
prosecution to take undue advantage of any gap between the
commencement of the adversary process and the time at which counsel is
appointed for a defendant. 30 1 Along with courts that had pre-existing. state
298 See State v. Piorkowski, 700 A.2d 1146, 1152 (Conn. 1997) (observing "we always
have recognized that the right to counsel is a personal right" (emphasis added)).
299 See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975) (observing that "a State is free as a
matter of its own law to impose greater restrictions on police activity than those this Court
holds to be necessary upon federal constitutional standards").
300 William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,
90 HARV. L. REv. 489, 502 (1977) (footnote omitted).
301 Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 301 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see, e.g.,
State v. Liulama, 845 P.2d 1194, 1199-1204 (Haw. Ct. App. 1992) (rejecting Patterson
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law right-to-counsel rules that opted them out of Patterson,3 °2 a fair number
of states have expressed dissatisfaction with Patterson's post-charge, pre-
"invocation" window of opportunity to question a defendant by securing
only a Miranda waiver. 303 The state response to Cobb's perhaps more
dramatic offense-specific approach to the Sixth Amendment has been less
clear, however, despite the passage of more than seven years since the
Supreme Court decided Cobb.
A. PRE-EXISTING STATE LAW MODELS: NEW YORK STATE
Prior to the Supreme Court's Cobb decision in 2001, New York State
already had a state-law right-to-counsel model that ensured that the state
would opt out of the Court's vision of an offense-specific Sixth
Amendment. Often described as the "indelible" right to counsel,304 New
York's right-to-counsel model is the closest parallel to the model that this
Article proposes for the interrogation context. Indeed, New York's
indelible right-to-counsel rule may protect the attorney-client relationship
even more broadly than the rule that I have proposed.3 °5
under state constitutions); State v. Sanchez, 609 A.2d 400, 406-09 (N.J. 1992) (same). But
cf Edwin J. Butterfoss & Lisa J. Burkett, Extending the Guiding Lefthand of Counsel: The
Minnesota Supreme Court Provides Protection Against Uncounseled Waivers of the Right to
Counsel During Interrogations, 17 HAMLINE L. REv. 307 (1993) (analyzing variations in
Minnesota state right to counsel rules, particularly state law restriction of the Patterson
decision); Shapiro, supra note 18, at 592-99 (considering state constitutional-law responses
to Patterson).
302 See, e.g., People v. Samuels, 400 N.E.2d 1344, 1347 (N.Y. 1980) (holding that
"[o]nce a matter is the subject of a legal controversy any discussions relating thereto should
be conducted by counsel: at that point the parties are in no position to safeguard their rights"
(quoting People v. Settles, 385 N.E.2d 612, 617 (N.Y. 1978))).
303 See Halama, supra note 265, at 1237 ("Several state courts have gone beyond limiting
Patterson to its facts, demanding a higher standard of waiver once adversarial judicial
proceedings have begun, regardless of whether the defendant is represented. These courts
have relied upon their state constitutional guarantee to counsel and their supervisory
powers .... ).
304 See People v. Grice, 794 N.E.2d 9, 10 (N.Y. 2003) (noting that "[tlhe indelible right
to counsel arises from the provision of the State Constitution that guarantees due process of
law, the right to effective assistance of counsel and the privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination"); see also Ofer Raban, The Embarrassing Saga of New York's Derivative
Right to Counsel: The Right to Counsel of Defendants Suspected of Two Unrelated Crimes,
80 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 389, 390 (2006) ("New York courts habitually ground their [right to
counsel] determinations in the collective authority of the New York Constitution's right to
counsel clause, the right against self incrimination, and the right to due process of law
(probably because all three clauses are grouped together in Article I, Section 6 of the New
York Constitution).").
305 See Peter J. Galie, The Other Supreme Courts: Judicial Activism Among State
Supreme Courts, 33 SYRACUSE L. REv. 731, 764 (1982) (arguing that the New York indelible
right to counsel rule "constitute[s] the strongest protection of right to counsel anywhere in
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First, the New York State right to counsel attaches in a broader range
of circumstances than the Sixth Amendment right: it adheres "when a
criminal action is formally commenced," 306 but it "can also attach before an
action is commenced when a person in custody requests to speak with an
attorney or when an attorney who is retained to represent the suspect enters
the matter under investigation. 30 7 Once this right attaches, New York law
protects the attorney-client relationship assiduously:
Once an attorney enters the proceeding, the police may not question the defendant
in the absence of counsel unless there is an affirmative waiver, in the presence of the
attorney, of the defendant's right to counsel. There is no requirement that the attorney
or the defendant request the police to respect this right of the defendant.
30 8
In evaluating the scope of this "indelible" right to counsel once it
attaches, New York courts have held that it operates derivatively in two
important respects that correspond to key ingredients of this Article's
proposal.30 9  The first circumstance involves interrogation on an
unrepresented matter when the defendant is represented on a separate
"offense," but where:
[Tihe two criminal matters are so closely related transactionally, or in space or
time, that questioning on the unrepresented matter would all but inevitably elicit
incriminating responses regarding the matter in which there had been an entry of
counsel. In such cases, interrogation on the unrepresented crime is prohibited even in
the absence of direct questioning regarding the crime on which counsel had
appeared.
310
When the unrepresented matter involves "crimes less intimately
connected" to the represented matter,311 a confession still will be suppressed
under New York law if the court determines that "the police were aware
that the defendant was actually represented by an attorney" and exploited
that attorney-client relationship to secure a confession on the unrepresented
matter.
312
The second New York rule, like the one proposed by this Article,
addresses defendants who are both represented and incarcerated at the time
the country").
306 Grice, 794 N.E.2d at 10.
307 Id. at 10-11; see also People v. Ramos, 780 N.E.2d 506, 509 (N.Y. 2002); People v.
West, 615 N.E.2d 968, 970 (N.Y. 1993); People v. Hobson, 384 N.E.2d 894, 897 (N.Y.
1976).
308 People v. Arthur, 239 N.E.2d 537, 539 (N.Y. 1968) (citation omitted); see also
Hobson, 384 N.E.2d at 897.
309 See Raban, supra note 304, at 420-28 (explaining and criticizing the derivative
function of New York's indelible right to counsel).
310 People v. Cohen, 687 N.E.2d 1313, 1316-17 (N.Y. 1997).
311 Id. at 1317.
312 Id.
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of interrogation. In this circumstance, if the represented defendant is in
custody, the defendant may "'not be interrogated in the absence of counsel
on any matter, whether related or unrelated to the subject of the
representation."
313
New York courts have seen these rules as "confer[ring] no undue
advantage to the accused., 314  Rather, as this Article has argued, these
courts have recognized consistently that "'[t]he attorney's presence serves
to equalize the positions of the accused and sovereign, mitigating the
coercive influence of the State and rendering it less overwhelming.'
315
Moreover, "the right protects against undue interference with any existing
attorney-client relationship, 316 a professional relationship that New York
courts have emphasized is critical to realization of the right to counsel itself:
An attorney is charged with protecting the rights of his client and it would be to
ignore reality to deny the role of counsel when the particular episode of questioning
does not concern the pending charge. It cannot be assumed that an attorney would
abandon his client merely because the police represent that they seek to question on a
matter unrelated to the charge on which the attorney has been retained or
assigned... it is the role of defendant's attorney, not the State, to determine whether
a particular matter will or will not touch upon the extant charge.., the attorney's
function cannot be negated by the simple expedient of questioning in his absence.
Observing that these controlling values are established by the
Constitution and our adversarial system of justice, not judicial conceptions
of the value of counsel weighed against the State's interests, New York
courts have consistently acknowledged the fact that "'the rule diminishes
the likelihood of a waiver of self-incriminating statements is immaterial to
our system of justice.
' ' 3 18
The New York indelible right to counsel rule is certainly an aggressive
constitutionalization of the attorney-client relationship under state law.
Other states have considered and declined to adopt state law rules as
protective as New York's right to counsel rules. 31 9 However, prior to Cobb,
"virtually every lower court in the United States to consider the issue ha[d]
defined 'offense' in the Sixth Amendment context to encompass such
313 People v. Burdo, 690 N.E.2d 854, 855 (N.Y. 1997) (emphasis omitted) (quoting
People v. Bing, 558 N.E.2d 1011, 1016 (N.Y. 1990)); see also People v. Rogers, 397 N.E.2d
709 (N.Y. 1979).
314 Rogers, 397 N.E.2d at 713.
315 Burdo, 690 N.E.2d at 855 (quoting Rogers, 397 N.E.2d at 713).
316 People v. West, 615 N.E.2d 968, 971 (N.Y. 1993).
117 Rogers, 397 N.E.2d at 713 (emphasis added).
3 8 Burdo, 690 N.E.2d at 855-56 (quoting Rogers, 397 N.E.2d at 713).
319 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Anderson, 862 N.E.2d 749, 758 (Mass. 2007); Lara v.
State, 740 S.W.2d 823, 835 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
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closely related acts., 320 Therefore, one might expect that some states might
opt out of Cobb's restrictive offense-specific standard for a state-law rule
that, if not as protective as the New York model, still might define the right
to counsel more broadly. For instance, states might invoke state law to
preclude interrogation of a represented suspect on subject matters factually
related to, or intertwined with, the subject matter of the representation, such
that questioning on the unrepresented case likely would elicit statements
protected by the attorney-client relationship.
B. STATE RESPONSES TO COBB?
The post-Cobb right-to-counsel landscape reveals a relatively modest
state reaction thus far. In State v. Hopson,32 1 a Wisconsin appellate court in
2004 applied a three-factor test to determine whether a crime about which a
represented defendant was interrogated was "directly related" to the matter
on which counsel represented the defendant. 322 Three other states explicitly
have left open the question of whether their state constitutions provide
greater protection than the Sixth Amendment rule under Cobb: Georgia,323
Washington, 324 and Oklahoma.3 25 Alaska courts post-Cobb have rejected
the New York right-to-counsel model,326 but also apparently never have
cited to Cobb, and prior to Cobb Alaska courts had indicated some
openness to a broader state right to counsel than offered by the federal
model.327 Montana courts also have suggested a broader state right to
counsel than the federal model, even subsequent to Cobb,328 and have not
cited to Cobb itself, although they have cited to Patterson and McNeil.
329
Finally, a Tennessee court post-Cobb has suggested, although equivocally,
320 Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 186 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing cases from
Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, and Maryland); see also Cobb, 532 U.S. at 168 n.1 (citing
Massachusetts and Pennsylvania cases applying a "factually related" standard rather than an
"offense-specific" standard).
321 No. 03-2696-CR, 2004 WL 1534129 (Wis. Ct. App. Jul. 7, 2004) (unpublished table
decision), rev. denied, 691 N.W.2d 354 (Wis. 2004).
322 See id. at *5 (considering "the persons involved, the types of offenses, the locations of
the crimes, and the time each was committed" (citing State v. Badker, 623 N.W.2d 142, 150
(Wis. Ct. App. 2000))).
323 See Chenoweth v. State, 635 S.E.2d 730, 733 (Ga. 2006).
324 See State v. Gregory, 147 P.3d 1201, 1233 (Wash. 2006).
325 See Warner v. State, 144 P.3d 838, 866 (Okla. Crim. App. 2006).
326 See State v. Garrison, 128 P.3d 741 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006).
327 See Loveless v. State, 592 P.2d 1206 (Alaska 1979). But cf Carr v. State, 840 P.2d
1000 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992) (referring to the right to counsel as "case specific").
328 See State v. Buck, 134 P.3d 53 (Mont. 2006).
329 See id; cf State v. Reavley, 79 P.3d 270 (Mont. 2003).
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that state law might provide a broader right than the federal model in some
respects.33 o
Some lower state courts, by contrast, have embraced an offense-
specific right-to-counsel standard post-Cobb, but have not cited to Cobb,
usually citing to McNeil instead.33' Other states courts have not cited to
Cobb, nor have explored the offense-specific standard in depth, but
typically have applied federal Sixth Amendment standards and have not
332
indicated that their state constitutions afford greater protection.
Several other state courts, however, have fallen squarely into the
offense-specific right-to-counsel camp. These courts either have applied
Cobb to similar factual circumstances or have cited to Cobb as authority
when addressing right-to-counsel issues outside of concrete offense-specific
circumstances.333
The state law response to Cobb, therefore, appears to trend in favor of
adopting the Supreme Court's "offense-specific" right-to-counsel standard.
A handful of notable open questions remain, however, particularly at the
state supreme court level. Still, the state law trend is most notable for its
modest and relatively quiet response so far to Cobb. Perhaps this quiet
330 See State v. Mitchell, 137 S.W.3d 630 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003).
331 See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 2005 WL 1953066 (Del. Super. Ct. June 29, 2005)
(unpublished decision); Hall v. State, 870 N.E.2d 449 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007); J.D.P. v. State,
857 N.E.2d 1000 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006); State v. Violette, No. CR-03-477, 2004 WL 3196905
(Me. Nov. 3, 2004); State v. Rouse, No. CR-03-727, 2004 WL 1433627 (Me. Apr. 1, 2004).
332 See, e.g., Exparte Stewart, 853 So. 2d 901 (Ala. 2002); Olive v. State, 10 S.W.3d 443
(Ark. 2000); State v. Transon, 924 P.2d 486 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996); People v. Anderson, 842
P.2d 854 (Colo. 1992); State v. Stenner, 917 A.2d 28 (Conn. 2007); State v. Abada, 68 P.3d
618 (Haw. Ct. App. 2002); Nika v. State, 97 P.3d 1140 (Nev. 2004); State v. Lefthand, 523
N.W.2d 63 (N.D. 1994); State v. Holland, 430 A.2d 1263 (R.I. 1981); Peterson v. Kennard,
156 P.3d 834 (Utah Ct. App. 2007); State v. Lang, 702 A.2d 135 (Vt. 1997); State ex rel.
Sims v. Perry, 515 S.E.2d 582 (W.Va. 1999).
333 See, e.g., State v. Dempsey, Nos. CRO1-7, CROI-8, 2001 WL 34034961 (D. Neb.
Aug. 6, 2001); People v. Wheelock, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 796 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); State v.
Anderson, 95 P.3d 635 (Idaho 2004); State v. Pennington, 80 P.3d 44 (Kan. 2003); State v.
Tsolainos, No. 2007 KW 2443, 2008 WL 4539246 (La. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2008); Walker v.
State, 892 A.2d 547 (Md. 2006); State v. Benson, 2008 WL 853128 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 1,
2008) (unpublished opinion); Smith v. State, 977 So. 2d 1227 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008); State v.
Dykes, 238 S.W.3d 737 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007); State v. Matey, 891 A.2d 592 (N.H. 2006);
State v. Harris, 859 A.2d 364 (N.J. 2004); State v. Desnoyers, 55 P.3d 968 (N.M. 2002),
abrogated by State v. Forbes, 119 P.3d 144 (N.M. 2005); State v. Strobel, 596 S.E.2d 249
(N.C. Ct. App. 2004); State v. Sapp, 822 N.E.2d 1239 (Ohio 2004); Commonwealth v.
Steward, 775 A.2d 819 (Pa. 2001); State v. Owens, 552 S.E.2d 745 (S.C. 2001), overruled
by State v. Gentry, 610 S.E.2d 494 (S.C. 2005); State v. Hoadley, 651 N.W.2d 249 (S.D.
2002); Alston v. Commonwealth, 570 S.E.2d 801 (Va. 2002). But see People v. Kruger, 845
N.E.2d 96 (I11. App. Ct. 2006); Martin v. Commonwealth, No. 2003-CA-000721-MR, 2004
WL 2755854 (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 2004); People v. Libbett, 650 N.W.2d 407 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2002); Anderson, 862 N.E.2d 749; Lewis v. State, 48 P.3d 1063 (Wyo. 2002).
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signals that state law constitutionalism has receded from Justice Brennan's
grand vision. Or, maybe it signals that in many states law enforcement has
not employed or abused the offense-specific model of interrogation in a
manner that has attracted significant judicial attention. Nevertheless,
perhaps over time some of these states, like New York, will opt out of the
federal right-to-counsel model, and prioritize the promise of counsel and the
attorney-client relationship during interrogation. At a minimum, the trend
is worth watching.
V. CONCLUSION
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel means what it says: when an
accused faces his or her accuser at a critical stage of the proceedings, like
an interrogation, "the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 3 34 The accused should not need to
ask for this assistance before the State is required to provide it. Nor should
the core professional relationship that this right conveys be one between
attorney and charging instrument. Attorneys represent people, people who
need legal services from a trained and strategic professional who can level
the playing field between the accused and the State, and ensure that the
accused's decision-making is informed by the substantive and procedural
rights that the law provides to an individual charged with crime.
Accordingly, the right to counsel during interrogation should be understood
in relational terms, where the State's authority to seek a confession from a
charged adversary must honor and preserve the attorney-client relationship.
If federal law itself remains unable to honor and preserve this relationship
fully, states should consider invoking their own constitutions to recognize
this relationship as a critical component to adversarial justice in their own
jurisdictions.
"' U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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